Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability by Drumbl, Mark A.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 46 | Issue 1
2014
Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and
Accountability
Mark A. Drumbl
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Mark A. Drumbl, Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability, 46 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 235 (2013)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol46/iss1/12
 Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 
Volume 46 Fall 2013 Issues 1 & 2
 
 
Child Pirates:  
Rehabilitation, Reintegration,  
and Accountability 
Mark A. Drumbl  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW·VOL. 46·2013 
235 
Child Pirates:  
Rehabilitation, Reintegration, 
and Accountability 
Mark A. Drumbl* 
Denounced by customary international law and recognized 
as a breach of jus cogens, maritime piracy also is defined and 
proscribed by a number of international treaties. Piratical 
attacks off the coast of Somalia, which peaked several years ago, 
have triggered considerable international attention. While 
incidents of Somali piracy are sharply decreasing, attacks 
persist elsewhere, for example off the Gulf of Guinea in Western 
Africa.  
The U.N. Security Council endorses a criminal justice 
model in response to acts of piracy. The Security Council 
thereby promotes a mechanism of judicialization and 
penalization. So, too, do the U.N. General Assembly, many 
states, international organizations (such as the International 
Maritime Organization), trade groups, and the shippers lobby. 
In the recent past, many detained pirates were perfunctorily 
captured and released. With the spread of the criminal justice 
model, however, pirates are increasingly facing prosecution in 
national courts, mainly in Kenya, Seychelles, and Maldives, but 
also in Germany, the U.S., India, France, Spain, Japan, and 
Somalia—among others. 
It has been estimated that approximately one-third of 
captured pirates are minors, that is, persons under the age of 
eighteen. This article explores issues of accountability, 
reintegration, deterrence and rehabilitation in the context of 
child pirates. It recommends modalities of restorative and 
reintegrative justice for child pirates that avoid the careless 
superficiality of immediate release and the retributive heavy-
handedness of criminal trials. Regrettably, prevailing imagery 
that cloaks juveniles enmeshed in international crimes, for 
example child soldiers, does not favor this middle ground. 
Instead, this narrative imagery facilitates either perfunctory 
release (the faultless passive victim image) or criminal trials 
regardless of age (the demon and bandit image). Unlike the case 
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with child soldiers, however, the position of U.N. entities when 
it comes to child pirates tends toward greater punitiveness—
assuredly, a concerning development. In response, and after 
examining why juveniles may end up in pirate gangs, this article 
proposes a new path, namely one that leads toward restorative 
justice initiatives. 
As [his lawyer] is leaving, Abdiwali [a juvenile pirate 
criminally prosecuted in Germany] says to him: ‘You 
are father and brother to me. Your rule of law is a 
miracle on earth. All the expense, and two lawyers 
fighting just for me, and I don’t have to pay any 
money at all! I have rights—I didn’t know that. I am 
grateful that I have the chance to learn this. It all 
seems like a fairy tale to me.’ 
And then he says to the interpreter: ‘But one thing is 
still a mystery to me: What do they get out of it?’1 
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I.  Introduction 
Maritime piracy is among the original universal jurisdiction 
crimes.2 Persons “committing thefts on the high seas, inhibiting trade, 
and endangering maritime communication are considered by sovereign 
states to be hostis humani generis (enemies of humanity).”3  
1. Beate Lakotta, Torture? Execution? German Justice Through the Eyes 
of a Pirate, SPIEGEL (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/world/torture-execution-german-justice-through-the-eyes-
of-a-somali-pirate-a-755340.html. 
2. See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 38 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of 
President Guillaume) (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is accepted in cases of 
piracy because piracy is carried out on the high seas, outside all State 
territory.”); see also Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 812 (9th 
Cir. 2011) (“One of the three violations of the law of nations laid down 
by Blackstone . . . was piracy.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
715 (2004). 
3. Republic v. Mohamed Sayid et al., Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2010 
[37] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2011). 
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Denounced by customary international law and recognized as a 
breach of jus cogens, piracy also is defined and proscribed by a 
number of international treaties, notably, the 1982 U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as follows: 
(a)  any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i)  on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or 
aircraft; 
(ii)  against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a 
place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a 
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a 
pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).4  
UNCLOS, which calls upon all states to cooperate to the fullest 
extent possible in the repression of piracy, provides a jurisdictional 
basis for the prosecution of acts of piracy.5 Resolutions of the U.N. 
Security Council and of the U.N. General Assembly, codes of conduct, 
and recommended best practices additionally round out the 
international regime applicable to piracy. The adoption of a number 
of these instruments was prompted by the frequency of piratical 
activity off the coast of Somalia in the late 2000s; (these particular 
instruments, moreover, remain limited in effect to the Somali 
situation).  
 
4. See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, opened for 
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 
1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]; see also Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation art. 3, opened 
for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 1992 (entered into force Mar. 
1, 1992) [hereinafter 1988 SUA Convention] (enumerating specific 
offenses that constitute piracy with its definition being used in certain 
domestic proceedings); Convention on the High Seas art. 15, opened for 
signature Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 
1962) (defining and proscribing piracy in a manner virtually identical to 
UNCLOS). Generally speaking, the UNCLOS definition of piracy 
matches the definition operative under customary international law. 
5. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 100, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability 
238 
Many states have domesticated piracy, including at times with 
explicit reference to international law,6 although not always in 
language identical to the UNCLOS definition.7 Other states have not 
 
6. In the case of the U.S., see 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2013) (“Whoever, on the 
high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, 
and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be 
imprisoned for life.”). This statutory language traces to An Act to 
Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of 
Piracy, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819) (which required death as 
a mandatory sentence). Piracy, to be clear, was initially defined by the 
First Congress in 1790 albeit in different language. See Crimes Act of 
1790, ch. 9, §§ 8, 9, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (1790). For an insightful 
argument that application of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 to minors would be 
unconstitutional in light of its mandatory sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole and the unconstitutionality of such sentences, pursuant 
to the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
see Lauren Hahn, Note, Juvenile Justice and Piracy: Prosecutions of 
Juvenile Pirates in the United States, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 241, 242, 
260–68 (2012). Hahn relies on the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in 
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Hahn’s unconstitutionality 
argument is strengthened by the 2012 U.S. Supreme Court opinion, 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which likely postdated 
publication of her piece. The Court held that imposing a sentence of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon a minor for 
homicide offenses violated the Eighth Amendment. For Hahn, the 
unconstitutionality of the U.S. piracy statute in the case of juvenile 
pirates means that juvenile piracy suspects would have to be charged 
under other applicable federal statutes. See Hahn, supra note 6, at 268.  
7. For example, see Section 65(1) of the Seychelles Penal Code as amended 
in 2010 which reads as follows: “Any person who commits any act of 
piracy within Seychelles or elsewhere is guilty of an offence and liable to 
imprisonment for 30 years and a fine of R1 million.” See Republic v. 
Abdukar Ahmed & Five Others, Judgment, Crim. Side No. 21 of 2011 
[2] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2011) (citing to Section 65(1) of the Penal Code). 
Section 65(4) of the Penal Code defines piracy as:  
(a) Any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or aircraft and directed- 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such a ship or 
aircraft 
(ii) against a ship or an aircraft or a person or property in 
a place, outside the jurisdiction of any State 
(b) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship 
or an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or a pirate aircraft; or 
(c) Any act described in paragraph (a) or (b) which, except for 
the fact that it was committed within a maritime zone of 
Seychelles, would have been an act of piracy under either of 
those paragraphs. 
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domesticated piracy per se or have done so in a manner that may not 
apply to certain categories of offenders (i.e., juveniles). In these 
jurisdictions, conduct tantamount to piracy could be prosecuted as 
cognately related ordinary crimes. On rare occasion, states have 
invoked universal jurisdiction under UNCLOS as a basis for piracy 
prosecutions.8  
Modern maritime piracy is much more than just a financial crime. 
In addition to the force they deploy to subdue the ship, pirates have 
in some instances traumatized their captives through mock (or actual) 
executions, psychological torture, sexual assault, and the use of 
crewmembers as human shields or slaves.9 In recent hijackings and 
attacks in West Africa, pirates based in the Niger delta inflicted harm 
directly on crewmembers.10 That said, the gravity of piracy typically 
is not comparable to the atrociousness of other international crimes 
such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and widespread war 
crimes.11 Piracy’s “defining characteristic,” after all, “is not its 
 
See Republic v. Liban Mohamed Dahir & Twelve Others, Judgment, 
Crim. Side No. 7 of 2012 [4] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2012) (citing to Section 
65(4) of the Penal Code). This section was enacted in response to 
jurisdictional challenges that had previously been brought. 
8. Hahn, supra note 6, at 247–48 & n.65. 
9. Rich Miller, Some Progress Noted in Deterring Pirates, but 
Mistreatment of Mariners Persists, PROF’L MARINER (Sept. 27, 2011), 
http://www.professionalmariner.com/October-November-2011/Some-
progress-noted-in-deterring-pirates-but-mistreatment-of-mariners-
persists/. 
10. Piracy, including hijackings, in the Gulf of Guinea affects Bénin, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, Gabon, and, most 
directly, Nigeria. See Ryan Cummings, The Rise and Rise of Piracy in 
the Gulf of Guinea, THINK AFR. PRESS (July 18, 2013), 
http://thinkafricapress.com/politics/gulf-guinea-africas-new-piracy-
hotspot. The International Maritime Organization has suggested that 
the frequency of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea is about fifty per 
year, though it indicates this is a conservative estimate. Id. 
11. Sohail Choudhury, Mysterious World of Somali Pirates, SOMALI THINK 
TANK (Aug. 27, 2011), http://somalithinktank.org/ mysterious-world-of-
somali-pirates/ (“In most of the hijackings, the bandits have not harmed 
their prisoners.”). But see Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on 
Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Annex Report 
to the Letter dated Jan. 24, 2011 from the Secretary-General to the 
President of the Security Council, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 
2011) (by Jack Lang) [hereinafter Lang Report] (noting that growing 
pressure by instigators of piracy, the remoteness of areas of operation, 
and the increase in ransoms sought tend to augment the level of violence 
of pirate attacks and extend the duration of periods of hostage 
detention). 
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heinousness, but that it occurs outside any nation’s sovereign 
territory.”12 
In recent years, anti-piracy patrols have reportedly released over 
90 percent of captured suspects.13 This means that, upon capture, the 
vast majority of pirates never come to face any official process of 
accountability for their alleged conduct. For those suspects who are 
not summarily released, however, the central impulse among 
international lawyers and policymakers is to pursue criminal 
prosecutions. The U.N. Security Council endorses a criminal justice 
model as a responsive mechanism to acts of piracy connected to the 
situation in Somalia.14 The Security Council thereby promotes a 
model of judicialization and penalization. So, too, has the U.N. 
General Assembly, which in Resolution 66/231 generally calls for the 
apprehension and prosecution of persons alleged to have committed 
 
12. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 813 (9th Cir. 2011). 
13. Lang Report, supra note 11, ¶ 14. There is some indication that, among 
captured pirates, the percentage of those summarily released is declining 
over time with a corresponding increase in the percentage of those who 
face criminal process. The U.N. Security Council has criticized capture 
and release practices in the case of Somalia. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1950, 
pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010) (“Noting with concern 
that the continuing limited capacity and domestic legislation to 
facilitate the custody and prosecution of suspected pirates after their 
capture has hindered more robust international action against the 
pirates off the coast of Somalia, and in some cases has led to pirates 
being released without facing justice, regardless of whether there is 
sufficient evidence to support prosecution . . . .”); S.C. Res. 1976, pmbl., 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011) (“Further expressing concern 
over a large number of persons suspected of piracy having to be released 
without facing justice, reaffirming that the failure to prosecute persons 
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts of the international 
community . . . .”); S.C. Res. 1918, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 
(Apr. 27, 2010) (“Affirms that the failure to prosecute persons 
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 
Somalia undermines anti-piracy efforts of the international 
community.”). 
14. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 13, ¶¶ 11, 13 (calling on “Member 
States to assist Somalia . . . to bring to justice those who are using 
Somali territory to plan, facilitate, or undertake criminal acts of piracy” 
and to “criminalize piracy under their domestic law”); S.C. Res. 1976, 
supra note 13, ¶ 14 (calling on states “to favorably consider the 
prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates 
apprehended off the coast of Somalia”); see also S.C. Res. 1816, para. 
11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, para. 14, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1851, para. 3, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008); S.C. Res. 1897, para. 6, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1918, supra note 13, ¶ 2; S.C. 
Res. 2015, para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
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acts of piracy.15 Since the International Criminal Court (ICC) and all 
other international criminal tribunals lack jurisdiction over piracy, 
these criminal prosecutions are to be conducted nationally, either in 
the accused’s state of nationality or extraterritorially (i.e., in a state 
with connection to the victims, in a state that has agreed to hear 
piracy cases, or in the vessel’s flag state).16 The criminalization model 
also has been explicitly propounded by the 2009 Djibouti Code of 
Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. 
Pursuant to this regional instrument, conducted under the aegis of 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO), signatories agree to 
cooperate in the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of piracy 
suspects and also to ensure that there are domestic laws in place to 
criminalize piracy.17 Twenty of the twenty-one eligible states in the 
region have signed the Djibouti Code of Conduct.18 The IMO also 
propounds a prosecutorial model in various resolutions it has 
adopted.19 This push has led to the adoption of agreements between 
states with the military capacity to capture pirates (for example, the 
U.K. and members of the EU) and certain states that have developed 
piracy courts to receive these defendants (notably, Seychelles, 
Kenya,20 and Mauritius). 
 
15. G.A. Res. 66/231, ¶¶ 81, 84–85, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/231 (Apr. 5, 
2012) (encouraging “States to ensure effective implementation of 
international law applicable to combating piracy, as reflected in the 
Convention, and calls upon States to take appropriate steps under their 
national law to facilitate, in accordance with international law, the 
apprehension and prosecution of those who are alleged to have 
committed acts of piracy”).  
16. The prospect of establishing a new international piracy tribunal is most 
unlikely, in part because of the prevalence of tribunal fatigue and also 
because of the political complexities such a process would entail. See 
Lang Report, supra note 11, ¶ 78.  
17. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression 
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti Meeting Res. 1, arts. 2(1)(c), 4, 
11 (Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Djibouti Code of Conduct], available at 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20En
glish.pdf. 
18. Djibouti Code of Conduct, IMO, www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/ 
Pages/DCoC.aspx (visited on Feb. 14, 2014). 
19. See, e.g., Int’l Maritime Organization [IMO], Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, IMO 
Assemb. Res. A. 1044 (27), at 4, 7 (Nov. 30, 2011) (supporting legal 
regimes and arrangements between states that facilitate piracy 
prosecutions). 
20. Kenya prosecuted several piracy cases in 2008 and 2009. It did so 
pursuant to agreements it had signed with a small number of states and 
the EU to receive captured pirates. In 2010, however, Kenyan 
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Although much of the recent flurry of international legal activity 
on the subject of piracy is expressly limited to the situation in 
Somalia,21 the international law and policy community’s endorsement 
of penal law, criminal prosecutions, and imprisonment for offenders is 
of a much broader cadence. U.N. Resolution 66/231, for example, is 
general in scope in its discussion of prosecutions; treaties such as 
UNCLOS are obviously of general application as well. Part of the 
motivation of limiting the effect of certain Security Council 
resolutions only to the Somali situation, moreover, derives from the 
fact that these resolutions, adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter, call upon states to use all necessary means, such as deploying 
naval vessels and military aircraft, to repress acts of piracy.22 
 
authorities complained about the international community’s failure to 
adequately support these often costly prosecutions. Furthermore, in 2010 
the Mombasa High Court ruled that Kenyan courts lacked the 
jurisdiction to prosecute pirates unless the act of piracy occurred within 
Kenya’s territorial waters. This decision nixed Kenya’s ability to 
prosecute any cases involving Somalis. The transfer programs, then, 
were effectively gutted. In 2012, however, a specially created entity in 
the Kenyan Court of Appeals overturned this decision, determining that 
Kenya would have universal jurisdiction over piracy. The Kenyan 
courts, therefore, would once again be able to adjudicate piracy cases 
involving Somalis on the high seas. See C W Lupao, Courts Can Try 
Piracy Offences on the High Seas, THE STAR (Oct. 18, 2012), 
http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-93302/courts-can-try-piracy-
offences-high-seas (summarizing the legal decisions and debate regarding 
the jurisdiction of Kenyan courts in piracy cases). To date 115 pirates 
have been convicted in Kenya. See Sulakshna Beekarry, Chief of Piracy 
Prosecutions in Mauritius, Comments made at End Game! An 
International Conference on Combating Maritime Piracy at Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law (Sept. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlsx8y06-k4 (noting also that 112 
pirates have been convicted to date in Seychelles). 
21. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 13, ¶ 8 (affirming “that the 
authorizations renewed in this resolution apply only with respect to the 
situation in Somalia and shall not affect the rights or obligations or 
responsibilities of Member States under international law, including any 
rights or obligations, under [UNCLOS], with respect to any other 
situation, and underscores in particular that this resolution shall not be 
considered as establishing customary international law”). Restrictions as 
to the instrument’s effect only to the Somali situation also emerge in 
other Security Council resolutions. See G.A. Res. 66/231, supra note 15, 
¶ 90; Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 17, art. 2(2) (“The 
Participants intend this Code of conduct to be applicable in relation to 
piracy and armed robbery in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of 
Aden.”). 
22. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 14, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1838, para. 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008), S.C. Res. 2020, para. 7, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). Resolution 1816, however, also 
makes a general statement reaffirming guiding principles in the 
repression of piracy on the high seas including “apprehending persons 
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Essentially, regardless of where piratical activity originates, punitive 
justice measures would very likely inform the best practices that the 
international community would envision as suitable to combat such 
activity. The Security Council sees a link between criminal 
prosecutions and deterrence of piratical conduct in the Somali 
situation, as does the IMO, and there is no reason to believe that 
either would see things differently in other situations.23 Tellingly, the 
prosecutorial model infuses the newly drafted Code of Conduct 
adopted at the maritime conference held in Yaoundé, Cameroon.24  
In this article, within the context of child25 pirates (who I define 
as pirates under the age of eighteen),26 I recommend a new path, 
 
engaged in such acts with a view to such persons being prosecuted.” 
S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 14, pmbl. 
23. See S.C. Res. 1918, supra note 13, ¶ 1; Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], 
Guidelines to Assist in the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annex, at 1, MSC.1/Circ.1404 (May 23, 
2011) (“The capture, prosecution and sentencing of pirates and armed 
robbers is probably the most appropriate deterrent action available to 
Governments.”). 
24. Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] et al., Code of 
Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against 
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa, 
arts. 2(1)(c), 4(4) (June 25, 2013) (demonstrating a commitment to 
national level prosecutions of pirates).  
25. In this article I interchangeably use the terms child, juvenile, and minor; 
I understand each term to cover persons under the age of eighteen at 
the time of the alleged piratical conduct. 
26. My approach accords with the norms of international human rights law, 
which conceptualize children as persons under the age of eighteen. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex art. 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (November 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC] 
(including 193 state parties). Child soldiers, and children associated with 
armed forces and armed groups, as a protected class are understood as 
being under the age of eighteen. See, e.g., UNICEF, Cape Town 
Principles and Best Practices (Apr. 27–30, 1997), available at 
http://www.unicef.org/emerg/ files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf 
(defining a child soldier as “any person under 18 years of age who is 
part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in 
any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers 
and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members”); 
UNICEF, The Paris Principles: The Principles and Guidelines on 
Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, ¶ 2.1 (Feb. 
2007), available at http://www.child-
soldiers.org/childsoldiers/Paris_Principles_March_ 2007.pdf (defining a 
child associated with armed forces or armed groups as: “any person 
below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited 
to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, 
spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is 
taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.”).  
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namely, modalities of restorative and reintegrative justice that avoid 
the careless superficiality of immediate release and the retributive 
heavy-handedness of criminal trials. I would, moreover, advocate the 
same recommendation to adults of low-rank in piracy gangs.  
Regrettably, prevailing imagery that cloaks juveniles enmeshed in 
international crimes, such as child soldiers, does not favor this middle 
ground. Instead, this narrative imagery facilitates either perfunctory 
release (the faultless passive victim image) or criminal trials regardless 
of age (the demon and bandit image).27 I have elsewhere argued that, 
when it comes to the social reintegration of former child soldiers, 
these sensationalist images belie the nuances of child soldiers’ 
experiences and fail to promote their best interests.28 The fact that a 
similar dynamic is playing out in the context of child pirates is 
frustrating. Unlike the case with child soldiers, however, the position 
of U.N. entities when it comes to child pirates tends toward greater 
punitive measures. Assuredly, this is a concerning development. 
Whether criminal trials for piracy (or extraordinary international 
crimes more generally) have deterrent effect remains an unsettled 
question. Other than for the highest level leaders or offenders, I 
remain a skeptic in this regard; even in these cases, I believe the best 
justification for international penality resides in expressivism. My 
doubts on the deterrent front are even more pointed when it comes to 
child defendants. On the other hand, perfunctory release is also of 
negligible deterrent value and, in fact, may simply encourage 
recidivism on the part of both adult recruiters and child participants. 
Deterring children from becoming pirates and solidly reintegrating 
former child pirates into civil society constitute two vastly 
understudied concerns.29 This is one reason, among many, why 
buttressing an end-game to piracy is so crucial. Tellingly, a Google 
search on “child pirates” mostly yields references to Halloween 
costumes and various ideas for pirate-themed toddler birthday parties. 
But the unsettling reality is that juvenile piracy is no laughing 
matter. It poses a unique set of challenges to current legal 
 
27. For detailed treatment of this theme, see MARK A. DRUMBL, 
REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 6–11 
(2012). 
28. Id. at 11. 
29. Cf. S. WHITMAN, H. WILLIAMSON, M. SLOAN & L. FANNING, DALHOUSIE 
MARINE PIRACY PROJECT: CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN MARINE PIRACY – 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND THE WAY FORWARD (MARINE AFFAIRS 
PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT #5) 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.dal.ca/content/dam/dalhousie/images/faculty/science/mari
ne-affairs-program/Technical_series/MAP%20Technical%20Report%20 
%235.pdf (noting that “many who are involved in studying or 
addressing marine piracy have failed to pose questions regarding the 
involvement of children and youth”). 
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frameworks; prosecuting countries should reconsider their laws, 
sentencing guidelines, and notions of retributive justice.  
Part II of this article sets out data on piracy generally and also 
addresses some specifics regarding juvenile involvement. Part III 
summarizes current efforts to criminally prosecute child pirates in 
instances where capture and release policies are not implemented. 
Part IV explores why juveniles may end up in pirate gangs. Part V 
assesses the deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions of juvenile pirates 
and proposes a new path, namely, one that leads toward restorative 
justice. Part VI then concludes. 
II.  Juvenile Piracy: Facts and Figures 
In recent years, the epicenter of pirate attacks has been located in 
the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, and the western Indian Ocean 
adjacent to the Horn of Africa—specifically, off (often far off) the 
Somali coast. Initially, Somali pirates operated in relative proximity 
to the Somali coast, but then broadly extended their activities 
(through the deployment of “motherships” and skiffs) well beyond the 
littoral—even up to 1,700 nautical miles from their land bases.30 Many 
pirates hailed from Puntland, a self-governing region in northeast 
Somalia.31 The U.N. Security Council has recognized that “the 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia 
exacerbate the situation in Somalia, which continues to constitute a 
threat to international peace and security in the region.”32  
It is, however, imprudent to exaggerate the frequency of pirate 
attacks. Most pirate attacks do not result in a successful hijacking, 
and pirate attacks occur against only a fraction of the total number of 
merchant vessels that transit through the Arabian Sea and Indian 
Ocean. Furthermore, the number of pirate attacks involving Somalis 
has sharply declined over the past two years.33 The International 
 
30. See, e.g., IMO, supra note 19, at 5.  
31. See generally Jonathan R. Beloff, How Piracy is Affecting Economic 
Development in Puntland, Somalia, 6 J. STRATEGIC SECURITY 47 (2013) 
(exploring the various reasons why piracy has grown in Puntland).  
32. S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 13, pmbl. 
33. See Int’l Chamber of Shipping [ICS], Lessons Identified from Somali 
Piracy, at 1, ICS(13)(37) (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.ics-
shipping.org/icsorange/icscirculars13/allmembers.htm (“[T]he number of 
successful attacks against ships by Somali pirates has reached a five-year 
low.”); see also Choudhury, supra note 11 (“By the first half of 2010, 
these increased policing efforts by Somali government authorities on 
land and international naval vessels at sea reportedly contributed to a 
drop in pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 86 a year prior to 33, 
forcing pirates to shift attention to other areas such as the Somali Basin 
and wider the Indian Ocean.”). 
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Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports eleven Somali-related piracy incidents 
in 2013, including two hijackings.34 
This dramatic reduction is in large part due to defensive and 
preventative actions taken by international shippers transiting the 
region. These actions include arming ships with private security 
forces, deploying military protection, and adopting 
internationally-endorsed best management practices. The IMO, for 
example, has supported extensive and detailed guidance that covers 
everything from lighting, controlling access to the ship’s bridge, 
recommended speeds, and lookouts, to use of constructed dummies 
and razor wire on board, and many other precautionary measures.35 
Military deployments in the region, such as those undertaken by EU 
Operation Atalanta and NATO’s Operations Allied Protector and 
Ocean Shield, also have helped quell pirate attacks. In the end:  
The mass exodus from the piracy trade may have more to do 
with a broken business model than a sudden change of 
heart. . . . The decline has been largely attributed to the 
increased presence of armed-guard detachments on board 
merchant vessels. It is currently estimated that 30 percent to 40 
percent of commercial vessels traveling through the Gulf of 
Aden employ private security, a response to skyrocketing 
ransom demands and increasingly lengthy captivity periods for 
hijacked crews.36 
The effect of these measures is likely far greater than that of criminal 
prosecutions, particularly of low-rank offenders, which in turn 
suggests a valuable lesson regarding the place of criminal trials in 
deterring international piracy or international criminality more 
generally. This is not to deny the salience of the growing muscularity 
 
34. Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME 
SERVS., http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-
centre/piracynewsafigures/275-piracynewsafigures (last updated Oct. 22, 
2013). See also Joseph Akwiri, Somali Pirates Sentenced to Seven Years 
in Prison, REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2013) (reporting that “[i]n a sign that 
piracy is still a threat, the European Union Naval Force for Somalia, 
said last week that a fully loaded crude oil supertanker fought off and 
repulsed pirates off the Somali coast on October 11”). 
35. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships in Waters off the Coast of Somalia, Best Management Practices 
for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, Annex 2, 
MSC.1/Circ.1339 (Sept. 14, 2011) (referring to BMP4: BEST 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST SOMALI BASED 
PIRACY 23–30 (2011)).  
36. Jay Bahadur, Somalia Offers Amnesty to Junior Pirates to End 
Hijackings, THE DAILY BEAST (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast. 
com/articles/2013/03/03/somalia-offers-amnesty-to-junior-pirates-to-
end-hijackings.html. 
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of the emergent network to prosecute and incarcerate pirates but, 
rather, to mindfully contextualize the effects of these legal proceedings 
within a much broader picture. 
A positive shift in the domestic, political, and security situation 
within Somalia has also helped stanch the frequency of piratical 
attacks. In January 2013, the U.S. announced recognition of Somalia’s 
government led by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, which has 
been described by Washington as “the first permanent, representative 
government in Somalia in two decades.”37 As will be further discussed 
infra, the Mohamud government has depleted the ranks of pirate 
gangs through the use of incentive measures, including amnesties in 
the case of juveniles, and has also succeeded in curbing the influence 
of the Islamist Al-Shabaab militant group throughout the country. 
Surely, these changes in the domestic landscape influence the 
economic and social incentives that may pull some Somalis into 
piracy. Investment of capital and ideas into dynamic business 
ventures in Somalia, such as the expansion of Jubba Airways (a 
Somali airline serving de facto as the national carrier), also helps 
anchor inchoate economic development.38 
This is not to say that the threat of pirate attacks off the Somali 
shores has disappeared. Somalia, after all, remains an extremely 
fragile place, with recurrent terrorist violence and domestic turmoil.39 
Stability is tenuous, and the continued renewal of very expensive 
international military patrols in the region is not guaranteed. In any 
event, even at its apex, piracy off the Somali coast did not account for 
all incidents of global maritime piracy, though Somali pirates 
operating in an enormous High Risk Area (stretching well off the 
Somali coast, to the Suez and Strait of Hormuz in the north, west 
into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, and south into the 
Mozambique Channel) certainly accounted for a substantial number 
of the world’s pirates.40 Of great immediate concern is that piracy is 
 
37. United States Recognizes Government of Somalia After Two-Decade 
Hiatus, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 436, 436 (John R. Crook ed., 2013). 
38. Joshua Hammer, Somalia’s Somewhat Friendly Skies, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/magazine/ 
somalias-somewhat-friendly-skies.html (but noting also that in 2012, 
“the Washington-based nonprofit organization Fund for Peace ranked 
Somalia No. 1 on its Failed States Index for the fifth consecutive year, 
ahead of Congo, Sudan and Zimbabwe”). 
39. The U.S. Department of State reports that “[t]oday, Somali pirates hold 
hostage one ship and approximately 60 mariners.” Press Statement: 
Sentencing of Somali Pirates Involved in the Attack on the S/V 
QUEST, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/212809.htm.  
40. The IMB “reported that, in 2011, there were 439 piracy attacks 
worldwide, 237 of which occurred off the coast of Somalia. In 2010, 445 
attacks were reported, and the numbers of crewmembers taken hostage 
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spiking in West Africa, notably in the Gulf of Guinea (which extends 
from Gabon to Liberia), which has been taken up by the U.N. 
Security Council; youths are implicated in these attacks, which affect 
a large number of littoral states.41 Piracy also is afflicting Pakistan 
and South East Asia.42 The IMB reports 206 piracy incidents in 2013, 
including 11 hijackings, 30 of which are Nigeria-related.43 The 
proportion of Somali-related piracy incidents in 2013 represents only a 
fraction—under 6 percent of world-wide incidents. Moreover, attacks 
against fishermen within territorial waters often fail to become 
reported even though these attacks look a lot like pirate attacks. 
Hugh Williamson, for example, notes the occurrence of 50 attacks 
against fishing vessels in one week alone in the Bay of Bengal, which 
include hostage-taking and violence; he also notes underreporting in 
the case of attacks off the coast of Guyana.44 Classification of an 
attack as a pirate attack, then, may be under-inclusive.  
When it comes to past attacks involving Somalis, moreover, 
vexing questions persist as to how to approach detainees, including 
juveniles, accused or convicted of piracy.45 On this subject, “[t]he U.N. 
Office on Drugs and Crime estimates there are . . . an estimated 1,000 
 
significantly increased—from 188 in 2006 to 1,181 in 2010. Similarly, in 
2009, there were 406 piracy attacks, 196 of which occurred [in] the Gulf 
of Aden or off the Somali coast.” Hahn, supra note 6, at 243. For more 
information on the High Risk Area, see IMO, supra note 35, at 4, 86–87. 
41. See ICS, supra note 33, at 1 (noting “a parallel crisis, involving 
disturbing levels of violence against ships’ crews, is now developing in 
West Africa”); Cummings, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that the Gulf of 
Guinea “has overtaken the Somali coast as Africa’s main piracy hotspot, 
and this upward trend looks set to continue”). 
42. Rear Admiral Daya Dharmapriya, Countering Maritime Piracy: A South 
Asian Perspective (Sept. 27–28. 2012) (paper presented at Regional 
Counter-Piracy Workshop in Colombo, Sri Lanka) (on file with Oceans 
Beyond Piracy), http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ 
dharmapriyas_paper_formatted.pdf (explaining the expansion of trade 
in South Asia and nearby regions, and its consequent attraction for 
Somali pirates).  
43. Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, supra note 34. 
44. Hugh Williamson, Dalhousie University, Comments made at End Game! 
An International Conference on Combating Maritime Piracy at Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law (Sept. 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=euqcpQsMAlU#t=1657.  
45. One observer found that “many Somali youth linked to piracy are held 
in foreign jails.” Sonia Messaoudi, Child Pirates: A Key Issue for 
Respecting Child’s Rights and Halting Piracy, COMMUNIS HOSTIS 
OMNIUM (Oct. 23, 2012), http://piracy-law.com/2012/10/23/child-
pirates-a-key-issue-for-respecting-childs-rights-and-halting-piracy/.  
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Somalis in custody for the crime of piracy in about 20 countries.”46 
Relatedly, efforts are required to ensure that juvenile pirates who 
have been captured, repatriated, and released do not gravitate toward 
criminal or anti-social behavior. Furthermore, past attacks still 
present serious issues of reparative justice for the many victims. 
Nationals and property of many states have been victimized by pirate 
attacks, including: Thailand, the Netherlands, Bangladesh, the, U.S., 
the U.K., China, Ukraine, France, Bulgaria, Greece, the Philippines, 
Malta, Myanmar, Denmark, Iran, Pakistan, and the Russian 
Federation. The costs of contemporary piracy—to which juveniles 
contribute—are steep. When additional patrols, ransom, insurance, 
and damages are totaled, it has been estimated that piracy costs 
between $7 billion and $12 billion dollars annually.47 Other costs not 
reflected in these sums involve naval support, the rerouting of ships 
on trajectories that may be slower, and delays in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid. Loss of life, of course, cannot be so readily 
quantified. 
No comprehensive demographic studies of pirate populations have 
yet been conducted. Nevertheless, media, academic, and informal 
sources commonly report that approximately one-third of all captured 
pirates are children48—specifically, under the age of eighteen—
particularly in the case of Somalis. Many child pirates are very poor 
and illiterate.  
46. Somali Youth Warned Not to Become Pirates, VOICE OF AM. (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/somali-kids-in-kenya-warned-
not-to-become-pirates-139513578/159616.html. 
47. Child Pirates: Raising Awareness About a Serious Issue, RCI (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.rcinet.ca/english/daily/interviews-2012/14-23_2013-
03-20-child-pirates-raising-awareness-about-a-serious-issue/. For a higher 
estimate, see Choudhury, supra note 11 (“Piracy has impeded the 
delivery of shipments and increased shipping expenses, costing an 
estimated £10 billion a year in global trade.”). 
48. Child Pirates: Raising Awareness About a Serious Issue, supra note 47 
(stating that “almost a third of the pirates are juveniles, or even 
children as young as 10 or 11 years old”); see also Misha Noble-Hearle, 
Child Pirates: A World Away From Play, DALHOUSIE UNIV. (Mar. 20, 
2013), http://www.dal.ca/news/2013/03/20/young-pirates-on-the-high-
seas-.html (observing the same); Messaoudi, supra note 45 (same); 
Roméo Dallaire et al., Child Pirates Are Everybody’s Problem, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/ 
globe-debate/child-pirates-are-everybodys-problem/article544972/ (“The 
outbreak of piracy in the Horn of Africa highlights the fact that, in that 
region (as well as in many of the other areas where piracy is a problem), 
more than half the population is under 18. About a third of the pirates 
captured recently are reported to be 14 or 15.”). Some media reports 
define child pirates as being below the age of fifteen years. See, e.g., 
Rajat Pandit, 25 of 61 Pirates Arrested by Navy at Sea Are Children 
Below 15 Yrs, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Mar. 17, 2011). In my opinion, this 
is an unduly narrow and somewhat archaic definition. 
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One problem that recurrently surfaces in criminal prosecutions of 
alleged pirates is that defendants often claim to be minors. These 
claims, however, are very difficult to verify.49 Somalia, for example, 
lacks a system of birth registration. In light of the problems in 
establishing precise birth dates through documentary evidence, a turn 
to testimonial evidence may be required. Yet such evidence may be 
imprecise, vague, and vacillating.50 In response, a number of 
jurisdictions that have undertaken criminal prosecutions have used 
forensic testing of bones and dental examinations to assess the 
veracity of these claims. In some cases, this testing has corroborated 
the claims. Yet more often the testing disavows the claims of 
minority. Such testing, moreover, has given rise to disputes whether 
forensic markers keyed to age determinations among western children 
are applicable, mutatis mutandis, universally. Regardless, even if some 
claims of minority on the part of captured pirates are unfounded, a 
substantial number of captured pirates still are minors. 
For the most part, piracy is not an ideological crime. It is not 
animated by eliminating or persecuting protected or identifiable 
groups. It is not terroristic in that it is not intended to coerce or 
intimidate a civilian population so as to achieve some sort of political 
goal. Some sociological analysis suggests that certain Somali pirates 
may justify their actions through a political or corrective justice lens, 
in light of how they have suffered from the dumping of toxic waste by 
international ships in offshore waters, illegal fishing, and degassing.51 
But, for the most part, Somali piracy is motivated by private ends 
such as escaping poverty, pursuing lucre, and securing some financial 
 
49. See U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Possible 
Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons for 
Acts of Piracy, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) (“Many 
suspects apprehended have no identification papers, and sometimes no 
precise knowledge of their own age. There may be real practical 
difficulties, therefore, in determining their age with any certainty.”). 
50. But see United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 675–76 (E.D. Va. 
2010) (recounting that at trial in a U.S. piracy prosecution, a Somali 
interpreter testified without objection that, while many Somalis may not 
know their actual birth date, they typically know their birth year). 
51. See Lakotta, supra note 1 (“The poor on the Somali coast see piracy as 
compensation for past injustices. For years, foreign fleets depleted their 
fishing grounds, while others dumped their toxic wastes in their waters. 
Eventually the fishermen hit upon the idea of getting something back. 
What began as a politically motivated David-versus-Goliath campaign 
has grown into a criminal industry that supports entire villages.”). For a 
more skeptical account on this point, see Lang Report, supra note 11, 
¶ 13 (“Although the nexus between piracy, on the one hand, and illegal 
fishing and toxic waste, on the other, continues to be invoked without 
having been proven to date, piracy has in essence become an organized, 
lucrative and attractive criminal activity undertaken for heinous ends.”). 
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gain amid dire conditions and paucity of opportunities.52 Similarly, 
piracy originating in the Niger delta has been linked to “extreme 
levels of poverty, a high unemployment rate and bureaucratic 
corruption,” as well as “the environmental damage caused by the oil 
industry [which has] adversely affected the region’s once lucrative 
fishing and agricultural industries, thus limiting options for local 
youths to enter the economy.”53 In comparison to Somali piracy, 
attacks in the Gulf of Guinea tend not to focus on the acquisition of 
ransom or extortion (in exchange for release of the ship and crew) 
but, instead, on theft of cargo following hijacking.54 
A study conducted by Eugene Kontorovich reveals a global 
average sentence of just over fourteen years for all piracy convictions 
involving Somali pirates sentenced outside of Somalia.55 According to 
Kontorovich, however, the data indicates a pronounced variance for 
substantially similar conduct. Place of prosecution therefore matters 
considerably in sentence length. European countries sentence Somali 
pirates more leniently, while the U.S. and Asian states sentence more 
harshly (note, this study did not include sentences issued in Somalia 
itself). The Seychelles mean adult sentence is 14.3 years and the 
Kenyan mean is 10.8.56 On the one hand, this variance poses a 
challenge to consistency in punishing universal crimes. But, on the 
other hand, these disparities also reflect the pluralistic role of national 
legal systems in the enforcement of international crimes. Notably, the 
average sentence of fourteen years for a pirate (who—regardless of 
exact chronological age—tends to be young, not necessarily a violent 
or discrimination-fuelled offender, and often an indiscriminate member 
 
52. See Hahn, supra note 6, at 244 (“Most academics and piracy experts 
suggest that purely economic reasons and opportunism motivate pirate 
attacks . . . .”). Another factor that correlates to membership in 
piratical (and criminal) gangs is the status of the recruit’s clan within 
Somalia’s hierarchical clan structure. See THE WORLD BANK, THE 
PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, REBUILDING A NATION, at 
xxv, 75 (2013) (exploring the role that the clan and subclan structure 
plays in recruitment and organization of Somalia based piracy).  
53. Cummings, supra note 10. 
54. Id. (“Gulf of Guinea pirates generally sail captured vessels to locations 
off the coast of the Niger Delta, where oil, cargo and/or fuel reserves are 
looted and transferred onto the pirate’s barges. The ship and its crew 
are then usually released.”). 
55. Eugene Konotorovich, The Penalties for Piracy: An Empirical Study of 
National Punishment for International Crime 1 (Northwestern Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 211, 2012), available at 
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1210&context=facultyworkingpapers. Sentences in Kenya have been 
reduced in light of recognition of the low-rank of many of the convicts 
within piracy gangs. 
56. Id. at 14. 
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of a crew), is identical to that rendered by the International Criminal 
Court, tasked to prosecute the most serious crimes of concern to the 
world community, in its first conviction, that of Congolese rebel 
leader and child soldier recruiter Thomas Lubanga.57  
III.  Criminal Prosecutions of Juvenile Pirates:  
An Overview 
The U.N. Security Council, U.N. General Assembly, UNCLOS, 
IMO, and the Djibouti Code of Conduct endorse the criminalization 
of piracy and the prosecution and punishment of captured pirates. 
Although catalyzed by the Somali situation, this endorsement has 
acquired broader normative traction while interfacing awkwardly with 
juveniles who may be enmeshed in pirate attacks.  
In response to a request by the U.N. Security Council in 
Resolution 1918, the Secretary-General issued a report identifying 
seven options for the Security Council to consider so as to “further 
the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.”58 Options 
ranged from enhancing domestic judicial capacity to creating a 
regional tribunal, to establishing an international tribunal. This report 
accorded specific, albeit brief, attention to juvenile pirates, suggesting 
that the Security Council “would need to consider whether special 
provision should be made for their treatment.”59 Reference was made 
in this regard to the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
which limits jurisdiction to alleged offenders over the age of fifteen 
and stipulates particularlized treatment, in accordance with the 
international rights of the child, for alleged offenders under the age of 
eighteen.60 That said, this Report is an outlier in actually offering 
specific discussion of juvenile pirates. Other international 
 
57. David Smith, Thomas Lubanga Sentenced to 14 Years for Congo War 
Crimes, THE GUARDIAN (July 10, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
law/2012/jul/10/icc-sentences-thomas-lubanga-14-years. 
58. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible 
Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons 
Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast 
of Somalia, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter 
Report on Possible Options]; see also Lang Report, supra note 11, at 2, 
¶ 104 (focusing on a plan “to prosecute and imprison persons who 
engage in piracy” and advocating criminal justice paradigms including 
specifically in Somalia where, at time of the report, the offence of piracy 
was not in the Somali Criminal Code). 
59. Report on Possible Options, supra note 58, ¶ 46. 
60. Id.; S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 13, pmbl. (expressing “concern about the 
reported involvement of children in piracy off the coast of Somalia” but 
failing to address this concern in concrete or operational terms). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Child Pirates: Rehabilitation, Reintegration, and Accountability 
253 
interventions do not address juvenile piracy as a separate matter. A 
report submitted by Jack Lang, Special Adviser to the Secretary-
General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, to 
the Secretary-General, focused on criminal response mechanisms. This 
Report favored the establishment of a specialized piracy court system 
in Puntland, and extraterritorially in Tanzania, and also lacked 
reference to any accommodation for accused juveniles.61 U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1976, which praised the Lang Report and urged 
the establishment of specialized Somali courts and an extraterritorial 
Somali anti-piracy court to try suspected pirates, contained no 
reference to juveniles accused.62 The Djibouti Code of Conduct is also 
silent on the subject, as is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 66/231; 
as are IMO resolutions and best management practices; and as is the 
2013 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed 
Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and 
Central Africa. 
Alleged child pirates have come to face trials nationally63 in a 
number of jurisdictions, including Somalia, Kenya,64 Seychelles,65 
India,66 Italy,67 France,68 Yemen, Germany,69 Japan,70 Spain,71 
 
61. See Lang Report, supra note 11, at 3, 4 (recommending also the 
“immediate construction of two prisons, one in Somaliland and one in 
Puntland, each with the capacity to hold 500 prisoners”).  
62. The Lang Report was met with accolades from the Security Council 
which, inter alia, urged international assistance to “increase prison 
capacity in Somalia, including by constructing in the short-term 
additional prisons in Puntland and Somaliland.” S.C. Res. 1976, supra 
note 13, ¶ 22.  
63. For surveys of these cases, see Hahn, supra note 6, and Danielle Fritz, 
Child Pirates from Somalia: A Call for the International Community to 
Support the Further Development of Juvenile Justice Systems in 
Puntland and Somaliland, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 891 (2012). 
64. See, e.g., Republic v. Hassan M. Ahmed & Nine Others, (2006) Criminal 
Case No. 434 (Chief Magistrate Ct.) (Kenya), aff’d Hassan M. Ahmed v. 
Republic, [2009] eKLR (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (rejecting a claim by one of 
ten defendants that he was a minor at the time of the offense and 
imposing a seven-year sentence on each of the ten accused). 
65. See Fritz, supra note 63, at 893 & n.7. 
66. Hahn, supra note 6, at 259; WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4 
(noting thirty-eight alleged pirates under the age of eighteen as being on 
trial in India). Somali piracy is of professed concern to India and the 
Indian Navy: “With the Indian Navy and Coast Guard trying all they 
can to curb the Somalian pirates that have brought horror to sailors, 
charging them under rioting, damaging government property and other 
criminal offenses as well as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act and 
Arms Act.” Anita, Child Soldiers Below 15 Turn Pirates in Somalia, 
ONE INDIA NEWS (Mar. 17, 2011, 8:56 IST), 
http://news.oneindia.in/2011/ 03/17/child-soldiers-below-15-turn-
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Malaysia,72 and the U.S. Some of these prosecutions are ongoing, some 
were ultimately abandoned, and some have resulted in convictions. In 
cases where convictions have been entered, in certain cases the child 
pirates are then summarily released owing to time already served in 
detention while awaiting trial. 
In Hamburg, Germany, beginning in 2010, ten Somali pirate 
defendants were jointly prosecuted. Charges related to the hijacking 
of a German cargo ship, the MV Taipan, in the Gulf of Aden. Armed 
with AK-47s, the Somalis had boarded the MV Taipan. A nearby 
Dutch military frigate, the Tromp, then intercepted the Taipan. After 
a brief exchange of fire, the Somalis were apprehended and eventually 
extradited to Germany for prosecution. After several of them claimed 
to be minors, German officials moved the trial in its entirety to 
juvenile court (although most of the accused did not claim to be 
 
pirates-in-somalia-aid0113.html. The Indian Penal Code lacks “a specific 
provision dealing with piracy.” Rajat Pandit, supra note 48. 
67. Italy prosecuted four Somali minors, pulled from a larger group of 
defendants, in juvenile court for their involvement in a pirate attack on 
the Montecristo, an Italian cargo vessel. Hahn, supra note 6, at 242, 
259. 
68. WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4. 
69. Id. 
70. Masami Ito, Somali Teenager Gets Five to Nine for Piracy, THE JAPAN 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/02/26/ 
national/somali-teenager-gets-five-to-nine-for-piracy/#.Um3K3PmkosA 
(“An 18-year-old Somali was sentenced . . . to five to nine years by the 
Tokyo District Court for boarding and attempting to hijack a 
Bahama-registered oil tanker off the east coast of Africa in March 
2011. . . . [Presiding judge] Ono . . . said he hesitated to hand down the 
maximum penalty because of several factors, including that the 
defendant was believed to be only 16 years old at the time of the attack 
and that he had grown up in a country torn by an ongoing civil war.”). 
This defendant was part of a group of four (the trials are being held in a 
series, and one other defendant is a minor as well), but was the only one 
who could speak English and, in this regard, the Presiding Judge found 
that “he was supposed to play a large role in the hijacking by 
communicating with the hostages.”). Id. 
71. Spain convicted two pirates for their attacks on the Alakrana, a Basque 
vessel. One claimed to be a minor. The Spanish judge, after 
investigating the question and ordering tests, determined this defendant 
to be an adult. Hahn, supra note 6, at 241–42, 257–58.  
72. Malaysia prosecuted three minors for the piratical hijacking of a 
chemical tanker. Hahn, supra note 6, at 242, 260 (“Malaysian 
prosecutors have confirmed that the three juveniles will not face 
execution because they are underage.”). 
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juveniles). Complexities involving proof of age plagued this trial,73 as 
did translation issues. At one point, questions arose whether forensic 
evidence had to be considered in light of the specifics of biological 
growth in East Africa, as opposed to in comparison with Western 
children.74 All of these complexities—which do reflect an attempt for 
the proceedings to satisfy due process standards—contributed to the 
languid pace of the proceedings. The trial lasted nearly two years, 
rendering it one of Germany’s longest since the Second World War.75  
On October 19, 2012, the ten accused were convicted of abduction 
for the purpose of blackmail and conducting an attack on maritime 
traffic. The court found “claims that the defendants had been coerced 
into the kidnappings to lack credibility.”76 The lead judge, Bernd 
Steinmetz, said “the pirates had hoped for a ransom payment of at 
least $1 million. Looking at the defendants, he said: ‘Each of you had 
been expecting a share, even if just a small one.’”77 Convicts were 
sentenced to terms ranging from two to seven years’ imprisonment. 
Juvenile defendants were punished at the lower end of the spectrum, 
namely two years, which meant that they would simply be freed 
owing to the extensive time they had already served in pre-trial and 
trial detention. All sentences were considerably lower than what 
 
73. See Lakotta, supra note 1 (“One pirate stated that he was born under a 
tree, while another could only say he was born during the rainy 
season.”).  
74. See id. (“The court spent several days deliberating over whether 
so-called growth plates, which are found in the bones of children and 
adolescents but not of adults, could be considered reliable indicators of 
age. When an expert on wrist bones from the University Medical Center 
Hamburg-Eppendorf was called to testify, he projected X-rays onto a 
screen in the courtroom. He proceeded to deliver a lecture on 
calcification in the sesamoid bone of the thumb, bone stages and 
skeleton age, percentile curves, sectional imaging and summation 
methods, the 20-bone method, point values and diagrams—all based on 
data obtained from Central Europeans. But does any of this apply to 
people of a different ethnicity, not to mention people who were 
malnourished and had to work hard from an early age?”). 
75. Verdict in Somali Hijacking Case: Court Rules in Germany’s First 
Modern-Day Piracy Trial, SPIEGEL (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.spiegel. 
de/international/germany/hamburg-court-hands-down-somali-pirate-
sentences-a-862350.html; Beate Lakotta, An Expensive Farce: 
Germany’s Somali Pirate Trial Is Pointless, SPIEGEL (Sept. 12, 2012), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-trial-of-somali-
pirates-turns-into-pointless-and-expensive-farce-a-855252.html (“[In 
April 2012], the court had to release the three youngest defendants since 
they had already been held in custody for two years. They are now 
attending school.”).  
76. Court Rules in Germany’s First Modern-Day Piracy Trial, supra note 
75. 
77. Id.  
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prosecutors had requested. One observer explained: “[T]he court 
stressed especially the danger of the act, the heavy weaponry used, 
the damage dealt to the vessel and the high criminal energy, but also 
the situation in Somalia under which the accused grew up, the fact 
that there were no complaints against the accused during this 
detention and the short duration of the abduction.”78 In light of the 
apparent ban on deportations from Germany to Somalia, it is unclear 
whether the convicts would be returned to Somalia. The juvenile 
convicts, in fact, have been learning German and are in school. 
Questions of minority have arisen, albeit tangentially, in U.S. 
piracy prosecutions. Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse was prosecuted for 
his involvement in an attack on the Maersk Alabama, a U.S.-flagged 
ship, in April 2009, and the kidnapping of its captain.79 Muse was 
initially charged with piracy, but he entered a guilty plea in May 2010 
to lesser charges of hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping, and 
conspiracy. Although Muse lacked birth records, his lawyers alleged 
he was a minor at the time of the offense. Following a hearing, 
however, the judge determined Muse to be an adult.80 Part of Muse’s 
plea bargain was a commitment by the defense not to appeal the age 
question.81 The defense did, however, raise the age question when it 
came to its sentencing brief, in which it claimed Muse to be sixteen 
and provided considerable evidence in this regard.82 The judge was 
not at all swayed by this information and Muse was sentenced to the 
maximum permissible term in the available range—over thirty years’ 
imprisonment.83 Muse did not benefit at all from suggestions that he 
 
78. Roger L. Phillips, Long Road to Justice – The German Piracy Trial, 
COMMUNIS HOSTIS OMNIUM (Oct. 21, 2012), http://piracy-
law.com/2012/10/21/long-road-to-justice-the-german-piracy-trial. 
79. Complaint at 2–3, United States v. Muse, No. 09-mj-01012-UA 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2009). 
80. Hahn, supra note 6, at 255 (“Citing the persuasiveness of the detective’s 
testimony, the conflicting testimony of Muse’s father, and the failure of 
Muse to testify as to his own age, the district court concluded that 
Muse was over eighteen and thus subject to trial as an adult.”); see also 
Benjamin Weiser, Pirate Suspect Charged as Adult in New York, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/22/nyregion/ 
22pirate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
81. Hahn, supra note 6, at 255. 
82. See id. at 255–56 (describing that the defense offered, inter alia, 
affidavits from family members, ship logs, and dental records). 
83. Id. at 256 (stating that the district court gave Muse the maximum 
sentence of thirty-three and a half years). Specifically, Muse was 
sentenced to 405 months imprisonment together with a restitution 
order. Press Release: Somalian Pirate Sentenced in Manhattan Federal 
Court to 405 Months in Prison for Hijacking Three Ships and for 
Hostage Taking, FBI (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/ 
press-releases/2011/somalian-pirate-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-
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was a misguided lost child, even though his lawyers specifically 
invoked this imagery on the topic of sentencing, pleading that “like 
other young Somalis, [Muse] had been driven into piracy by the 
abysmal conditions in his war-torn country.”84 Muse, they submitted, 
grew up “in desperate poverty and was almost always hungry” and 
became “caught up in the piracy networks” while a young teenager.85 
Prosecutors tapped into countervailing imagery and described Muse 
as extraordinarily depraved, violent, and an undisputed leader. In the 
end, Muse’s youth proved irrelevant to questions of his culpability 
and inconsequential to his punishment.  
Juvenile status also surfaced in another U.S. piracy case, 
prosecuted in the Eastern District of Virginia, in which the Fourth 
Circuit ultimately dispensed with claims of minority by a defendant, 
Hasan, who had claimed eligibility for juvenile status.86 Hasan was 
among a group of five Somali pirates who in 2010 had unsuccessfully 
attacked a U.S. Navy frigate, the USS Nicholas, which had been 
engaged in anti-piracy activities. The pirates mistook the USS 
Nicholas for a merchant vessel.87 After initiating their attack, all five 
were quickly captured. Prosecutions were undertaken under domestic 
U.S. law that inter alia criminalized piracy as a violation of the law of 
nations.88 All defendants were convicted and sentenced to life 
 
court-to-405-months-in-prison-for-hijacking-three-ships-and-for-hostage-
taking. In another U.S. case, involving the pirating of the civilian yacht 
S/V Quest off the coast of Oman and the killing of four Americans on 
board, fourteen suspects were captured and brought to the U.S. to face 
prosecution in federal court in Norfolk Virginia. Corinne Reilly, Arabian 
Sea Piracy Suspects Appear in Norfolk Court, PILOT ONLINE (Mar. 11, 
2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/03/arabian-sea-piracy-suspects-
appear-norfolk-court. A fifteenth person, a minor, also had been initially 
captured, although he had been found to have played a “relatively 
minor role in the attack.” Id. No charges were brought against him; he 
was released at sea and returned to his family. Id. On August 2, 2013, 
three of the Somali pirates implicated in the S/V Quest incident were 
sentenced to life imprisonment on convictions inter alia of piracy and 
kidnapping resulting in death. Prosecutors had sought the death 
penalty. The eleven other accused had previously pleaded guilty and 
had received life sentences. Press Statement, supra note 39; Jury 
Recommends Life for ‘S/V Quest’ Somali Pirates, BBC (Aug. 2, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23556256.  
84. Benjamin Weiser, Leniency of Sentence for Somali Hijacker Is at Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/ 
nyregion/14pirate.html. 
85. Id. 
86. United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2012); see also 
United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 642, 672–77 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
87. Dire, 680 F.3d at 449. 
88. Id. at 451. 
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imprisonment plus eighty years. Similar to the Muse case, the district 
court judge ultimately determined that Hasan was not a minor at the 
time of the offenses. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.89 The Fourth 
Circuit noted that the government had the initial burden of proving 
Hasan’s age and that it had discharged this burden insofar as Hasan 
himself had told special investigatory agents that he was an adult, 
only to recant later.90  
As Hahn notes, in neither of these U.S. cases—unlike the situation 
in jurisdictions such as Spain, India, and Germany—did the court 
turn to medical or forensic evidence to help resolve the claims 
regarding the juvenile status of the defendants, even when defendants 
faced the possibility of very harsh sentences.91 U.S. courts relied 
primarily upon testimonial evidence.  
International human rights law does not bar juveniles from facing 
criminal prosecution, nor does it bar juveniles from ever being 
prosecuted as adults. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC) permits the “arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child,” but 
requires that these measures “shall be used only as a . . . last resort 
and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”92 The CRC precludes 
the death penalty and life imprisonment without parole as sentences 
for child convicts. Furthermore, the CRC requires that “every child 
deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults unless it is 
considered in the child’s best interest not to do so.”93 The CRC 
specifies a minimum level of due process protection for children 
subject to criminal proceedings,94 but also encourages the development 
of enhanced frameworks attuned to their specific needs. The CRC 
does not favor incarceration. Instead, it prefers rehabilitation and 
reintegration.  
In spite of this preference, the CRC does not bar incarceration. 
CRC Article 40(3)(a) requires parties to seek to promote the 
establishment of “a minimum age below which children shall be 
presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law”; 
however, this article sets no such age. That said, the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has considered fourteen as a low age for 
criminal responsibility and “has welcomed . . . proposals to set the age 
 
89. Id. at 449, 475–76. 
90. Id. at 476. 
91. Hahn, supra note 6, at 270–71. 
92. CRC, supra note 26, art. 37(b).  
93. Id. art. 37(c). 
94. See id. art. 40 (providing, among other protections, that a child be 
given notice of the charges and has the right against self-incrimination). 
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of criminal responsibility at eighteen.”95 The national law of virtually 
all states, which inform the general principles of law applicable 
internationally, provides for a minimum age below which a child is 
deemed incapable of criminal responsibility. Most states set this age 
within the seven to fourteen year range. 
Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), an instrument which predates the CRC, also 
precludes the imposition of the death penalty on persons under the 
age of eighteen at the time of committing a crime. The ICCPR also 
requires accused juveniles to be “separated from adults and brought 
as speedily as possible for adjudication,” and that juvenile offenders 
“be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to 
their age and legal status.”96  
A firm practice, pushed by global civil society and many U.N. 
actors, has emerged not to prosecute minors before international 
criminal tribunals on charges of serious international crimes such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and widespread war crimes. This 
practice is becoming de lege ferenda.97 Although this practice does not 
extend to national institutions, where minors have been prosecuted on 
such charges, it certainly helps sculpt national conversations on 
questions of transitional justice. It is therefore foreseeable that any 
international criminal tribunal that might hypothetically be 
established to deal with piracy as an international crime would be 
reticent about prosecuting minors. It also seems, however, that this 
reluctance within the international legal imagination to prosecute 
juveniles (often child soldiers) under the age of eighteen on charges of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes does not extend as 
firmly to juveniles accused of piracy or terrorism.  
In sum, minors exceptionally can be prosecuted at the national 
level as adults or in adult venues for serious, ordinary, and 
international crimes. Criminal prosecutions and jail time are 
discouraged, to be sure, but remain lawful under particularized 
conditions. However, there is a requirement that minors be treated 
differently from adults upon apprehension, and that they be separated 
from adult accused. Prosecuting juveniles like adults and punishing 
them like adults is an unusual situation that requires stated 
justification; proceeding indiscriminately in this regard would infringe 
 
95. Amnesty Int’l, Child Solders: Criminals or Victims?, at 15, AI Index 
IOR 50/02/00 (Dec. 2000) This committee helps monitor state 
compliance with the CRC.  
96. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 6(5), 10(2)(b), 
10(3), opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered 
into force March 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also id. art. 14(4) 
(requiring in the case of juvenile persons that trial procedure take into 
account their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation). 
97. See DRUMBL, supra note 27, at 102–03. 
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international human rights law. State actors must, furthermore, take 
the best interests of the child into account in all actions involving 
children.98 
Although piracy trials involving juvenile accused are to operate in 
line with international human rights law, it has been noted, 
disturbingly, that “there are no international legal instruments in 
place to prescribe the proper handling of child pirates captured at sea, 
nor are navies or private security firms explicitly trained on how to 
manage interactions with underage pirates.”99 Clarity in this regard is 
particularly important in light of increased reliance, recognized by 
best management practices, of private armed guards by international 
shippers; this clarity ought to encompass both detention practices as 
well as rules of engagement that concern the use of force. Yet, the 
IMO’s guidance on the use of private armed security personnel is 
silent on the question of what to do when a ship is threatened by 
juvenile pirates.100 
In any event, and unsurprisingly, there does not appear to be a 
consistent practice of separating child pirates from adult pirates when 
pirate crews are captured.101 Though these differentiations do happen 
in some instances, the practice is not predictable.102 In cases where 
 
98. CRC, supra note 26, art. 3(1). 
99. Carl Conradi, The Invisible Phenomenon of Child Piracy, CANADIAN 
NAVAL REVIEW (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.navalreview.ca/2013/02/ 
the-invisible-phenomenon-of-child-piracy/. 
100. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Revised Interim Guidance to 
Shipowners, Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk 
Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 (May 25, 2012), available at http://www. 
imo.org/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Document
s/MSC.1-Circ.1405-Rev2.pdf. 
101. See Child Pirates: A New Child Rights Challenge for Somalia, SOS 
CHILDREN’S VILLAGES (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.soschildrensvillages. 
ca/child-pirates-new-child-rights-challenge-somalia (“Child pirates have 
been detained in Somalia along with adults found guilty of piracy, says 
UN expert [Radhika Coomaraswamy].”). See also Fritz, supra note 63, 
at 899 (“Kenyan practice regarding the detention and trial of child 
pirates may violate the implied customary international law requirement 
for courts to treat children differently than adults in criminal 
proceedings.”); id. at 902 (“Most of the piracy cases in the Seychelles 
have involved some teenage pirate defendants. Despite how frequently 
children appear as defendants in these cases, the Seychelles has yet to 
implement unique approaches to child pirates. In fact, in the majority of 
the adjudicated piracy cases, the Supreme Court of Seychelles makes no 
mention of the age of the accused.”). 
102. Mauritius has given guarantees that were it to receive any juvenile 
pirates for prosecution, it would ensure that they be segregated from the 
general population. See Milena Sterio, A Report on the Possibility of 
Future Somali Piracy Prosecutions in Mauritius, EJIL: TALK! (Dec. 26, 
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this practice remains unpredictable, or is not adhered to whatsoever, 
a conflict emerges with the requirements of international human 
rights law. The result is a confusing hodge-podge in which the rights 
(and fate) of the detainee hinge upon the locus of detention. 
Sometimes juvenile pirate suspects are released, while the adults are 
not; sometimes the children are released following legal process;103 
while other times the children are released because all the pirates are 
released immediately following capture (i.e., “catch and release” 
policies). This latter option seems to be the most common: like with 
adult pirates, when “international naval forces capture juvenile 
pirates . . . [they] usually end up simply taking their weapons and 
releasing them.”104 This may appear humanitarian, and in line with a 
view of child pirates as blameless and having been cruelly used, but it 
is also perfunctory, superficial, and not necessarily supportive of the 
children’s best interests or conducive to staving off a longer-term 
recrudescence of criminality. Shelly Whitman and her colleagues aptly 
describe the de facto realities of capture and release policies as 
“returning the juveniles to a worst form of child labour.”105 
Barring specific justification in cases of an individual juvenile 
defendant, prosecuting juveniles like adults would affront settled 
international human rights law. Many states that elect to prosecute 
suspected pirates do divert accused minors into separate juvenile 
proceedings. But others do not. In some cases, a decision not to divert 
hinges upon some determination that the defendants (often members 
of the same crew) are to be jointly tried, regardless of their age. But 
this level of deliberation is not always evident. This deliberation must 
also take into account the best interests of the child. 
Although proceedings in the Seychelles initially were criticized for 
insufficiently engaging with the age of the suspects,106 more recent 
 
2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/a-report-on-the-possibility-of-future-
somali-piracy-prosecutions-in-mauritius/ (recounting that Mauritian 
prosecutorial staff and the Commissioner of Police stated that “any 
detained juvenile pirates, should Mauritius accept any such transfer, 
would be appropriately segregated from the general prison population”).  
103. See, e.g., Captured Child Pirates Sent Back to Somalia, THE GUARDIAN 
(Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/aug/14/ 
somalia-middleeast (reporting that two Somali children aged twelve and 
eleven, who were sailing with adult pirates, were captured by Seychelles 
police; the eleven-year old was acquitted because of his age and the 
twelve-year old was given a provisional release based upon his being 
sent back to Somalia). 
104. Child Pirates: Raising Awareness About a Serious Issue, supra note 47.  
105. WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 12. 
106. See Phillips, supra note 78 (“While the court in Hamburg went to great 
lengths to estimate as precise as possible the age of the accused, in the 
Seychelles, age has up to now not even been a criterion which lead the 
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Seychelles prosecutions have demonstrated considerable respect for 
juvenile rights in accordance with international human rights 
requirements. In a 2010 case, Republic v. Sayid, which involved nine 
pirates prosecuted in the Seychelles (seven of whom maintained they 
were minors between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, inclusively), all 
were prosecuted jointly and convicted of three counts of piracy.107 All 
were sentenced jointly and identically—eleven years on the first count 
and eleven years on the second count to run consecutively, and ten 
years on the third count to run concurrently.108 Insofar as each of the 
offenses carries a maximum sentence of thirty years, the accused could 
have faced a total maximum sentence of ninety years plus a hefty 
fine. In the sentencing judgment, Judge Dodin stated: “I have taken 
note of the stated age of each Accused. I am satisfied that they all 
have the requisite mental element for the commission of the offence 
they have been convicted of.”109 This was the sole reference to 
minority.  
In another case from the Seychelles, Republic v. Osman & Ten 
Others, the Judge Gaswaga noted that some of the accused were 
below the age of eighteen. In the case of these accused, it was 
remarked that “two probation officers were always present during the 
recording of each minor suspect’s statement as required by law, and 
all the accused (minors and adults) were jointly arraigned before this 
court pursuant to section 93 of the Children’s Act, Cap28.”110 In this 
latter judgment, appreciation is extended towards the minor status 
and compliance is sought with a provision of Seychelles’ law 
contemplating that minors and adults can be prosecuted jointly under 
certain circumstances. Each accused ultimately was convicted on two 
counts.  
In light of the above analysis, by 2012 the Seychelles pirate 
proceedings continued further along a path of domestication of 
international human rights requirements. In Republic v. Dahir & 
Twelve Others, the Supreme Court of Seychelles faced several minors 
among a group of otherwise adult accused. While noting that 
Seychelles law allows for adults and minors to be tried together, the 
Court also recognized that a probation officer had been “availed” to 
 
courts to distinguish between adults and juveniles with regard to the 
applicable penalties.”); Fritz, supra note 63, at 902. 
107. Republic v. Mohamed Sayid et al., Judgment, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2010 
[26] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2011). 
108. Republic v. Mohamed Sayid et al., Sentence, Crim. Side No. 19 of 2010 
(Supreme Ct. Sey. 2011). 
109. Id. (noting also that “Somalia is a failed state and that its citizens, 
including the Accused, are in apparently a permanent state of turmoil”).  
110. Republic v. Houssein Mohammed Osman & Ten Others, Judgment, 
Crim. No. 19 of 2011 [12] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2011). 
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each of the minor accused while they recorded their statements.111 One 
of the accused was eleven years old.  
According to Seychelles penal law, a person at least seven years 
old but not yet twelve years old cannot be held criminally responsible 
unless the prosecution proves that the accused “was capable of 
knowing that he ought not to do the act or make the omission.”112 In 
this instance, this burden had not been met, so this accused was 
acquitted and ordered returned to Somalia and reunited with his 
family.113 Four other defendants were minors, albeit aged twelve or 
above twelve, and hence could be convicted—which they were, 
together with the adults. When it came to sentencing, however, the 
Supreme Court of Seychelles differentiated on the basis of age. Under 
Seychelles law, a person under the age of fourteen cannot receive 
prison time, while persons between fourteen and eighteen can be 
imprisoned (although the court must first consider and discount other 
possibilities that are rehabilitative in nature).114 One twelve-year old 
convict, therefore, was conditionally released and ordered deported 
immediately to Somalia. The remaining juvenile convicts, those 
between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, were found to have 
committed a grave offense warranting a prison sentence despite their 
youth.115 Each received a prison sentence of two and a half years. The 
imprisoned minors were ordered to “be kept in a separate place from 
any adult offender during their incarceration,” as was the twelve-year 
old during the period pending his deportation.116 The convicted adults 
in this case each received twelve years; in the process of sentencing 
them the Supreme Court of Seychelles identified as an aggravating 
factor “the recruitment of juveniles whom [the adults] ought to have 
taken care of and guide[d] instead of encouraging them to get involved 
in criminal activities.”117 
 
111. Republic v. Liban Mohamed Dahir & Twelve Others, Judgment, Crim. 
Side No. 7 of 2012 [6] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2012). 
112. Id. at [41]. 
113. Id. at [41]–[42]. 
114. Republic v. Liban Mohamed Dahir & Twelve Others, Sentence, Crim. 
Side No. 7 of 2012 [7]–[9] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 2012). 
115. Id. at [10], [15]. One problem that arose was that the Court felt 
constrained not to pursue alternatives to imprisonment, some of which 
involved family commitments to abide by probationary measures, which 
the Court felt “cannot reasonably be applied to these convicts who have 
no family in Seychelles.” Id. at [16].  
116. Id. at [17]. 
117. Id. at [19]. In another Seychelles piracy case from 2012, Republic v. 
Mohamed Abdi Jama, the adult offenders received a sentence of seven 
years and the one juvenile offender a sentence of two years’ 
imprisonment respectively. Republic v. Mohamed Abdi Jama & Six 
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The U.N. Security Council has accorded limited attention to the 
requirements of differential treatment of minors and adults in the case 
of piracy. Security Council Resolution 1838, which condemned and 
deplored all acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, 
called on nations with vessels and aircraft in the area to use necessary 
means to repress acts of piracy.118 This creates a situation in which 
child pirates might become caught up in military actions and subject 
to military tribunals, from which several questions arise: What do 
military forces do when engaging with juvenile pirates? What about 
private contractors—do they shoot at juveniles if shot at? What sort 
of training is required to maturely prepare private contractors for 
such situations? Looking beyond armed engagement, would military 
prosecutions on a ship that detains pirates be able to deliver the 
differentiated treatment required under international law in the case 
of minors? Although Resolution 1950 expresses concern about the 
involvement of children in piracy off the coast of Somalia, it persists 
in calling for a criminal justice response thereto at the national level, 
which does not explicitly exclude child pirates from its purview, 
although it requires compliance with international human rights law. 
However, no reference is specifically made to children’s rights.119 
Experts have suggested that drone attacks could be deployed against 
the coastal bases of Somali pirates;120 in this situation, it would be 
virtually impossible to ensure that children be treated differentially.  
One may chide international law for its simplistic focus on 
chronology and for its focus on age—emergently, eighteen—as a 
bright-line. I have certainly done so in my own work, and I have 
 
Others, Sentence, Crim. Side No. 53 of 2011 [6] (Supreme Ct. Sey. 
2011). 
118. S.C. Res. 1838, supra note 22, ¶ 2. 
119. See S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 13, ¶ 12 (“Calls upon all States . . . to 
cooperate . . . in the investigation and prosecution of all persons 
responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of 
Somalia, including anyone who incites or facilitates an act of piracy, 
consistent with applicable international law including international 
human right law to ensure that all pirates handed over to judicial 
authorities are subject to a judicial process . . . .”); id. ¶ 13 (“Calls upon 
all States to criminalize piracy under their domestic law and to 
favourably consider the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of 
convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia, consistent with 
applicable international law including human rights law.”); id. ¶ 19 
(“Urges States parties to the Convention and the SUA Convention to 
fully implement their relevant obligations under these Conventions and 
customary international law and cooperate with the UNODC, IMO, and 
other States and other international organizations to build judicial 
capacity for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy 
and armed robbery at sea of the coast of Somalia.”). 
120. Choudhury, supra note 11.  
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underscored the shortcomings of making so much hay out of a simple 
birthday. I have also expressed concern that well-intended 
protectionism can become fulsome and thereby disable youth, deny 
their agency, and inhibit the creation of a rigorous culture of juvenile 
rights. Investing so much in a chronological straight-line, what is 
more, has a punitive element to it insofar as it means the law comes 
down very hard on persons just over the benchmark. For example, 
persons aged eighteen to twenty-five, this being a cohort that is still 
developing considerable neurobiological and cognitive function, are 
aggressively punished by the system, while it coddles those 
immediately below that threshold. Rather than propound categorical 
benchmarks, I have argued in favor of constructing transitions upon 
an incremental sliding-scale that actively engages with evolving 
capacities and recognizes evolving responsibilities. 
But, for the moment, chronological watersheds constitute the law, 
and entities operating under the law cannot blithely ignore it. The 
official attitude of influential U.N. organs toward child soldiers is 
much more protectionist (to counterproductive extremes, in fact, in 
the view that child soldiers are unwitting and faultless) than in the 
case of child pirates. This problematic paradox in turn reflects the 
international community’s engagement with militarized youth and its 
reticence towards criminalized youth.  
IV.  Why Do Juveniles Join Pirate Gangs? 
Journalistic accounts represent one among a paucity of sources 
that shed some light upon why juveniles end up in piracy gangs. 
Media reporting about the Hamburg trial offers some specific glimpses 
in this regard. One of the defendants, Abdiwali, claimed he was 
sixteen, so he was recognized as a minor by the court. In an interview 
with a German magazine, Der Spiegel, he stated: “What I did cannot 
be justified. But the court should know that I wasn’t trying to hijack 
a ship to get rich. I just wanted to survive.”121 What is more, 
“[h]unger and poverty, he said, had motivated him to commit this 
crime, and he never asked himself whether he wanted to be part of 
it—it had all seemed self-evident to him.”122  
In an earlier article in Der Spiegel reporting on the same trial, 
mention is made of an accused juvenile pirate called Youssef M.123 His 
 
121. Lakotta, supra note 1.  
122. Id.  
123. All the references in this paragraph are taken from A Precedent or a 
Farce? Court Faces Daunting Hurdles in Hamburg Pirate Trial, 
SPIEGEL (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-
precedent-or-a-farce-court-faces-daunting-hurdles-in-hamburg-pirate-
trial-a-740122.html. 
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story greatly parallels that of Abdiwali, and he shares the same 
lawyer—so it may well be that the two references actually are to the 
same youth. Regardless, this article also offers pedagogic insights into 
the complex incrementalism of paths of entry into juvenile piracy. 
Youssef M. stated he was tricked into joining the pirate gang. Born as 
the youngest of eight children in Somalia, many of his family 
members, including his parents, were killed in accidents or war. 
Beginning at the age of nine or ten, he worked odd jobs in a harbor. 
He was a night watchman, and later a fisherman at the age of 
thirteen. He told the German court that he went hungry and slept on 
the street when he lacked work. He then piloted a small motorboat, 
for good pay ($2 to $3 per day), and subsequently was asked whether 
he was ready for a very lucrative “bigger job” that would pay a flat 
fee of $500. Youssef M. claims he was not told details about what this 
bigger job would entail, but when on board a fishing dhow (itself 
hijacked) he then realized it meant hijacking a cargo ship. He added: 
“I did not think very hard about whether I should participate. 
Nevertheless, it seemed as if everything had been planned ahead of 
time and I had no choice. However, I was never threatened by 
anyone.” 
Youssef M.’s path to maritime piracy departs from sensationalized 
and dominant international narratives about children who become 
caught up in the perpetration of international crimes. These 
narratives, which circulate ardently in the case of child soldiers, tend 
to class juveniles either as faultless passive victims—abducted, 
helpless, and forced into criminal activities—or, on the other hand, as 
incorrigible demons who commit gruesome criminal acts with zeal and 
alacrity. I have elsewhere posited the inappositeness of these images in 
the case of child soldiers, where the faultless passive victim image 
dominates international legal and policy discourse.124 A disconnect 
arises between the projected image and the actual lived experiences of 
child soldiers. 
While many child soldiers indeed are brutally kidnapped and 
forced to commit atrocities in nefarious groups such as the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, these horrid situations are outliers. Worldwide, 
approximately two-thirds of child soldiers come forth on their own 
initiative to serve.125 Most child soldiers are neither abducted nor 
forcibly recruited. International activists and policymakers, 
nevertheless, heavily emphasize this path to militarization. While 
exposing this vile situation, this emphasis also leads to limited 
exploration of youth volunteerism. To be sure, in some instances the 
 
124. DRUMBL, supra note 27, at 6–7. 
125. See P.W. Singer, Child Soldiers: The New Faces of War, AM. FED’N OF 
TEACHERS, http://www.aft.org/newspubs/periodicals/ae/winter0506/ 
singer.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014).  
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agency of youth is quite narrow and, for all intents and purposes, may 
be illusory. In other instances, however, many juveniles come forth 
willingly, independently, and deliberately to serve.126 Their 
motivations are varied and include patriotism, economic goals, desire 
for training, political activism, and the appeal of militarized life.  
Most child soldiers are not young children; most are adolescents, 
often aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen.127 Environmental factors and 
situational constraints certainly influence their decisions to enlist, 
which include poverty, insecurity, lack of education, socialization into 
violence, and broken families. Children’s engagement with these 
factors, however, can be more usefully understood as interactive and 
negotiated processes of negative push and affirmative pull. In joining 
armed forces or groups, children may simply be pursuing paths of 
economic and occupational advancement, pursuit of political or 
ideological reform, and professional development. Children—
particularly, older adolescents—are not invariably lost on these paths. 
They traverse and cross them as best they can. However disturbing to 
outsiders, this may mean joining armed forces or armed groups.  
Moreover, at times, child recruits deceive their parents and other 
commanders. They conceal their age, travel great distances, and 
persevere tenaciously in their quest to associate with armed forces or 
groups. They may join despite community and family exhortations to 
the contrary. These children, too, count as child soldiers. Although 
armed groups may seek to undermine legitimate governments through 
macabre methods, they may also serve as engines of protest against 
illegitimate rulers, state authoritarianism, and kleptocratic 
dictatorship. Youth may be drawn to these movements, whether in 
apartheid South Africa, the Occupied Territories, Egypt, Libya, and 
Jewish resistance in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe. 
Child pirates are not child soldiers, to be clear, unless they 
operate within the context of armed conflict (whether international or 
non-international) and are members of a gang that constitutes an 
armed force or armed group. Armed forces are official state militaries, 
while armed groups are organized non-state entities distinct from 
those militaries (e.g., rebel militia and dissident factions). Although 
child soldiering cannot be directly analogized to child piracy, some 
parallels do exist between these two poignant phenomena, such that it 
might be instructive to glean some insights from the sociological 
realities of recruitment and enlistment into child soldiering.128 This 
means accepting that many child pirates are not forcibly recruited, 
abducted, or compelled to join gangs. In light of the largely 
 
126. See id. (finding, for example, that in four African countries, 64 percent 
of child soldiers joined without any threats of violence). 
127. WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 5. 
128. Accord id. 
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non-political nature of piracy gangs, economic motivations would 
likely be more centrifugal to the push and pull of recruitment. 
Abduction and forcible conscription might be even less prevalent 
when it comes to membership in piracy gangs than in armed forces or 
groups. While 40 percent of child soldiers are estimated to be girls, 
there seem to be far fewer female pirates.129 Crucially, when it comes 
to discussing child piracy, there also is much to be learned about not 
repeating the tired refrains that dominate conversations about child 
soldiering. These refrains may have initially directed international 
attention and denunciation towards child soldiering, but they now 
have come to stymie and hobble the development of effective 
preventative and rehabilitative mechanisms.  
Unfortunately, however, essentialized language also is emerging in 
the context of discursive portrayals of child pirates. Unlike the case 
with child soldiers, these stylized public images impressionistically 
arch toward the demon and bandit end of the spectrum. On this note, 
a news article from India is telling: 
The perils of the sea are plenty. . . . But who would have 
thought the threats would come from children who have turned 
deadly pirates. While Indian authorities are still grappling with 
the menace, the incidents of abduction and torture are only 
increasing. Only recently, [t]he Indian Navy managed to capture 
pirates who were terrorizing the seas and found that of the 61 
person[s] nabbed, 25 were children . . . below 15.130  
Tendentiously imbuing child pirates with characteristics of 
ignorance, weakness, and vulnerability (which track the tenets of the 
faultless passive victim model), however, also emerges as a rhetorical 
device in policy, journalistic, and academic discourse.131 International 
activists—as is the case with child soldiers—may downplay, talk over, 
or repudiate the possibility that any juvenile may volunteer to join a 
 
129. See MICHAEL WESSELLS, CHILD SOLDIERS: FROM VIOLENCE TO 
PROTECTION 9 (2006).  
130. Anita, supra note 66. This article then quotes from an official who offers 
a less sensationalist perspective: “‘It seems younger and younger 
children in Somalia are being pushed into piracy, which is proving 
immensely lucrative in the lawless country . . . the established pirates, 
who have got rich, are no longer sailing out on raids.’”  
131. See, e.g., Fritz, supra note 63, at 918 (“[T]heir young age combined with 
the social pressures that stem from membership in a particular clan 
raise serious doubts as to whether a child’s decision to engage in piracy 
is truly voluntary.”); Dallaire et al., supra note 48 (“Like child soldiers, 
child pirates are plentiful, easily indoctrinated, armed, fearless, cheap 
and viewed as expendable by the adults who employ them. In addition, 
it must be remembered that child pirates are often coerced into joining 
or have very few alternative options for survival.”). 
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pirate gang. One rhetorical device in this regard is to place the term 
voluntary (when referring to recruitment or membership) within 
quotation marks, thereby signaling its implausibility.132 Adults who 
become pirates are not making decisions truly out of free will either, 
but they do not benefit from the same presumption.  
My anecdotal impression is that the child soldier—even the child 
soldier who may commit terrible acts of atrocity—evokes greater 
empathy within the international legal imagination than the child 
pirate. This leads to differential application of metaphoric imagery. In 
this regard, the child pirate seems to share a similar fate to that of 
child terrorists or suicide bombers (whether child soldiers or not), who 
also are exempted from the prevailing “it’s not your fault” evasion of 
responsibility.133 Child soldiers who commit violence—for example, 
terrorist attacks—against Western targets are seen less like deluded 
children and more like menacing adults. Whereas the child 
perpetrator targeting Africans tends to be held as a mindless captive 
of purposeless violence, the child perpetrator targeting Westerners 
tends to be held as an intentional author of purposeful violence. The 
faultless passive victim image inures much more robustly to the 
benefit of children implicated in extraordinary international crimes 
against interests or populations outside the centers of global politics 
than those who target interests or populations within those centers. 
Child piracy, to be clear, affects Western interests. Some of the 
mariners, captives, and murdered crew members are Western 
nationals. The financial interests of Western shipping corporations or 
of ships flagged in Western states also are affected.  
An extensive array of legal protections inure to children in armed 
conflict, including influential instruments addressing children 
associated with armed forces or armed groups such as the 2007 Paris 
 
132. See, e.g., Conradi, supra note 99 (“While many children are forcibly 
recruited into piratical activity, others may join ‘voluntarily’. Such 
voluntary enlistment, however, must be understood in terms of the 
limited choices and circumstances that are available in the child’s 
country.”); WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 6–7 (“It should be noted 
that while many children are abducted and forcibly recruited, others 
may join ‘voluntarily’. . . . In Somalia, which demonstrates the highest 
involvement of child and youth pirates, it appears as if most young 
people are joining on a ‘voluntary’ basis.”). The use of quotation marks 
as a rhetorical device is commonly found in human rights reports and 
law and policy documents discussing child soldiers.  
133. For example, consider the outrageous situation endured by Omar 
Khadr, a Canadian child soldier detained at Guantánamo Bay as a 
minor, who had previously associated with Al-Qaeda. See Omar Ahmed 
Khadr, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/ 
news/2012/10/25/omar-ahmed-khadr (describing the egregious 
conditions under which he was detained, including incarceration with 
adults and abusive interrogations). 
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Principles. The Paris Principles, however, do not cover children 
associated with entities that fall short of the capacity to engage in 
armed conflict, such as organized syndicates, sex trafficking rings, 
drug cartels, and piracy gangs.134 The overwhelming focus on 
militarized children thereby diverts attention from the needs of 
criminalized children. A blind-spot emerges within the architecture of 
international law and policy. 
As with child soldiering, some children are duped into joining 
pirate gangs; they may think they are going to work on a ship only to 
learn, once at sea, that they are to participate in criminal conduct. 
Some children end up in piratical activity simply because they are 
born into families that engage in such activity.135 The point 
nonetheless remains that juveniles also may knowingly come forward 
on their own to join pirate gangs. Young people have some agency 
and autonomy, however circumscribed. Piracy, in this vein, is akin to 
a form of dangerous child labor. These juveniles have limited life 
options, to be sure, and many are very poor. The overwhelming 
majority of very poor youth enmeshed in difficult life circumstances in 
Somalia or the Niger delta, however, do not turn to piracy. Yet some 
do. For these individuals, piracy becomes a device to socially navigate 
their way around poverty and make the best out of bad 
circumstances. This is in large part because of the perceived 
short-term economic rewards:  
[T]he lucrative success of many hijacking operations have drawn 
a number of young men toward gangs of pirates, whose wealth 
and strength often make them part of the local social and 
economic elite. Abdi Farah Juha who lives in Garoowe [100 
miles from the sea] told the BBC: “They have money; they have 
power and they are getting stronger by the day. They wed the 
most beautiful girls; they are building big houses; they have new 
cars; new guns.”136  
 
134. See Paris Principles, supra note 26, ¶ 2.3 (defining armed groups as 
referring to “groups distinct from armed forces as defined by Article 4 of 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on 
the involvement of children in armed conflict”). Article 4 of the 
Optional Protocol does not provide a definition, however. Ostensibly, 
the fact that the Optional Protocol relates to the involvement of 
children in armed conflict intimates that armed groups are able to 
engage in such conflict. See Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict 
art. 4, May 25, 2000, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Feb. 12, 
2002). 
135. WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4. 
136. Choudhury, supra note 11. 
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Whitman also notes that “young and wealthy pirates are challenging 
the authority of both elders and Islamic teaching.”137 One article 
reported that Somali pirates “earn[ed] up to US$70,000/year; equating 
to almost 150 times their country’s national average wage.”138 The 
average ransom payment has been estimated at $2 million.139 In West 
Africa’s Gulf of Guinea, “most acts of piracy . . . are now perpetrated 
purely by criminal entities for financial purposes.”140  
In the end, it is glib to assume that juvenile participation in 
piratical activities hinges entirely upon vulnerable passivity or 
coercion, as opposed to the exercise of some level of agency, initiative, 
and action. But it is flatly erroneous to assume that juveniles join 
piracy networks out of some sort of Clockwork Orange fascination 
with delinquency and misanthropy. As Youssef M.’s experience 
indicates, child pirates are far from incorrigible predators.  
In sum, comprehensively understanding child piracy—and 
effectively deterring it—requires coming to terms with the nuanced 
and diverse experiences of the children, juveniles, and youth who 
enter piracy gangs, who are à la fois victims and victimizers.  
V. Toward Restorative Justice 
I question the retributive, deterrent, and expressive values of 
criminal trials—regardless of where they are held, but particularly 
when they take place in international courts or proceedings sited 
away from the defendant’s home jurisdiction—for children accused of 
extraordinary international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.141 I also remain deeply skeptical of the value 
of sequestered incarceration as punishment in such instances.  
The retributive ambitions of international criminal law are vexed 
by the widespread, grievous, and systematic nature of extraordinary 
international criminality. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes may be so grave that it becomes impossible to award a 
 
137. WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 6 (citation omitted). 
138. Choudhury, supra note 11. 
139. Hahn, supra note 6, at 244. 
140. Cummings, supra note 10; WHITMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 7 (“In 
Nigeria, young unemployed men, in particular, are frequently enticed 
into the organized pirate gangs operating in the Delta region by 
‘promised riches, fancy cars, luxury goods and weapons.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
141. My concerns in this regard extend well beyond juvenile accused. I am 
skeptical of the ability of the atrocity trial and sequestered incarceration 
to attain declared penological goals, regardless of the age of the 
defendant, with the exception of the very highest-level leaders. See 
generally MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
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perpetrator his or her just deserts while still respecting core human 
rights principles. Atrocity perpetrators tend to operate within 
situations of collective connivance. Paradoxically, however, atrocity 
perpetrators tend to have less autonomy and agency than the typical 
common criminal, yet their offenses typically are more serious. 
Assessment of their individual blameworthiness (a key element of the 
proportionality calculus central to retributive justice) accordingly 
becomes problematic. The fact that the scope of discretion exercised 
by many juvenile perpetrators of such crimes (for example, child 
soldiers), although not evanescent, generally is narrower than that of 
adults renders the determination of retributive punishment even more 
tenuous for them.  
I am unconvinced that adults primed to undertake acts of atrocity 
are deterred by the prospect that they might eventually be hauled 
before an international criminal tribunal or a national court. My 
doubts derive from multiple sources: the low likelihood of getting 
caught; the evidentiary difficulties in securing convictions; and 
selectivity in who actually gets prosecuted. Most foundationally, 
however, potential perpetrators of extraordinary international crimes 
may simply not engage in the kind of cost-benefit analysis that 
encourages them to stay acts of violence in the here and now owing to 
fears of eventual incarceration in the future. Once again, the 
narrower—albeit still tangible—scope of discretion typically available 
to child soldiers suggests that they would be even less deterrable than 
adults. So, too, does their typically more impetuous cognitive state, 
not to mention the effects of social pressures, gerontocratic power 
structures, and ingestion of narcotics in certain cases. 
Although the futuristic prospect of individual punishment by 
international or national criminal courts would likely not deter a child 
soldier from committing a crime within the vortex of collective 
violence, ironically, the prospect of criminal prosecution and 
punishment may inhibit the child soldier from the very different 
decision to abandon armed factions.142 Explicitly filling the justice gap 
with modalities other than retributive criminal trials and 
imprisonment, however, may pacify anxieties voiced by child soldiers 
and thereby encourage disarmament and demobilization while still 
helping prepare the juvenile for civilian life. 
The last major penological aspiration of international criminal law 
is expressivism. This aspiration involves authenticating an historical 
record and consolidating the value of law. In the case of child 
 
142. Roger Duthie & Irma Specht, DDR, Transitional Justice, and the 
Reintegration of Former Child Combatants, in DISARMING THE PAST: 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND EX-COMBATANTS 190, 213 (Ana Cutter 
Patel et al. eds., 2009) (reporting testimony from former child soldiers 
that they would not leave armed forces or groups were they to face the 
prospect of criminal trials).  
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perpetrators of international crimes, the dramaturgical aspect of the 
criminal trial—geared as it is to binaries of guilt or innocence and 
victim or perpetrator—is of modest value. Criminal trials for child 
soldiers, for example, yield superficial explanations of the etiology of 
mass atrocity. This especially is the case when trials are inspired by 
demon and bandit imagery that overplays the responsibility of the 
child. 
Penological goals of rehabilitation, restoration, and reintegration 
do not centrally figure among international criminal law’s aspirations. 
These goals, nonetheless, are very pertinent to juveniles (and low-level 
adult cadres, as well). Youth who commit extraordinary international 
crimes can become productive and functional community members. 
That said, incarceration does not foster reinsertion or reunification. 
Nor does it readily permit the making of amends. Assessments of 
duress, coercion, impairment, and the psychological effects of 
captivity (i.e., the “Stockholm Syndrome”) upon moral culpability are 
necessary in order for retributive punishment to be fair and 
proportionate. These assessments, however, are of greatly reduced 
salience when the goal of justice intervention is reintegrative, 
rehabilitative, or restorative in nature. When the focus of 
redressability shifts from retribution to rehabilitation, the 
proportionality between the offender’s blameworthiness and the just 
deserts that he or she deserves is not of central concern. 
Finally, the logistics of atrocity trials also inform my 
circumspection regarding their suitability, particularly in cases of 
juveniles. Technical procedures, complex evidentiary rules, and the 
role of counsel constitute key elements upon which the legitimacy of 
these trials rests. These elements, however, can alienate trial 
participants, including witnesses and defendants. Victims may find 
trials for international crimes frustrating in that they exert little to no 
control over its direction. They may also find such trials downright 
boring. 
What about the potential of criminal proceedings in cases of 
juveniles accused of piracy? I do not see any reason why such trials 
would not also entail the same complications and shortcomings as 
trials for genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. 
In terms of retribution, the typically less gruesome nature of 
piracy (as opposed to, say, genocide) might render the proportionality 
calculus easier for a court to finesse. On the other hand, this calculus 
is still imperiled by the collective nature of much of maritime piracy; 
it is a group-based crime, after all, with pirates operating in gangs. 
Measuring an individual’s moral culpability within this collective 
nexus therefore remains particularly challenging.  
As to the goal of deterrence, criminologists have long shown that 
it is the likelihood of getting charged, rather than the severity or 
lenity of the sentence, that most affects ex ante decisions whether to 
partake in criminal activity. Anti-piracy patrols perfunctorily release 
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most captured suspects.143 In some cases where pirates are detained, 
evidentiary shortcomings and gaps in the jurisdictional framework 
(states may not wish to pursue prosecutions or may lack the 
jurisdiction to do so) also contribute to the uncertainty of any given 
individual’s chances of facing criminal process. States may also balk 
at initiating extraterritorial piracy prosecutions owing to concerns 
over providing adequate conditions during pre-trial detention, and 
also concerns that detainees may file refugee claims in the event of an 
acquittal or after the conclusion of their sentence if convicted. Even in 
cases when juvenile suspects are brought into custody and prosecuted, 
however, there is cause to doubt the general deterrent value of such 
proceedings. On this note, when sentencing the ten Somali convicts, 
the Hamburg court stressed in its concluding remarks “that the trial 
was surely not able to prevent piracy or deter future perpetrators.”144 
One journalist, in discussing the upshot of the trial, wryly observed 
that “[t]he battle against piracy off the Horn of Africa won’t be won 
in German courtrooms.”145 Nor do I believe that it would be “won,” so 
to speak, in the courtrooms of the state of nationality of the accused 
either.146 Finally, penalization might inhibit youth from leaving pirate 
gangs, as has been suggested is the case with children associated with 
armed forces or armed groups. 
What about the expressive goals of criminal prosecution and 
incarceration for juvenile pirates? The German court, sentencing a 
mixed group of adults and minors at the time of the offense, 
reportedly underlined “that the trial was necessary with regard to the 
individual perpetrators and in order to communicate to the victims 
that the crime committed against them was punished.”147 Even 
assuming that criminalization supports this expressive goal, however, 
the fact remains that trials represent a very expensive way to 
communicate denunciation. In the case of the German trial, it was 
reported that it “could end up devouring between €7 million and €10 
 
143. See Lang Report, supra note 11, ¶ 14. 
144. Phillips, supra note 78. 
145. Lakotta, supra note 75 (noting also that: “The prospect of a German 
prison sentence isn’t going to make much of an impression on pirates in 
Somalia, whose ransom intake rose from $110 million (€85 million) in 
2010 to $170 million in 2011—in a country with an annual per capita 
income of $240.”). 
146. For a contrary argument, see Fritz, supra note 63, at 893–94 
(encouraging states to return accused child pirates to semi-autonomous 
regions within Somalia to face judicial proceedings in the burgeoning 
juvenile justice systems of these regions). 
147. Phillips, supra note 78. 
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million—a sum equal to more than half the annual budget of the 
U.N.’s anti-piracy program.”148  
In light of these persistent concerns, then, there is much to be 
said in support of Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who 
was quoted in the media in late February 2013 as stating his intention 
to “offer partial amnesty to boys involved with pirate groups.”149 
Another media report stated that “Somalia’s federal government is 
offering amnesty to junior pirates in an attempt to end the hijackings 
of merchant vessels . . . .”150 It is estimated that the amnesty “will 
cover 949 young pirates that [the Himan and Heeb] government has 
persuaded to give up [piracy].”151 These sorts of initiatives and 
negotiations are to be lauded. That said, if they assume the form of 
unqualified amnesties in which the implicated youths are forgotten 
and put out of sight and out of mind, then their overall effectiveness 
will be limited at best. This well-meaning and apparently 
compassionate approach may be just as pointless as criminal 
conventions and as neglectful as immediate capture and release. One 
foreseeable outcome of blanket amnesties is recidivism, namely, a 
return to criminal conduct, be it piracy or other offenses, owing to a 
lack of other occupational and educational options for the amnestied 
youth.  
A productive middle ground can be cultivated. Although 
juridification plays an important role in the reintegration of child 
pirates,152 as well as the delivery of justice to those individuals 
aggrieved by their criminal conduct, this does not necessarily require 
the enforcement of law through courtrooms, trials, and jails. An array 
of restorative, reparative, and rehabilitative justice modalities can 
instead be considered. These include traditional reintegrative 
ceremonies, public inquiries, reciprocal commitments to provide and 
participate in educational and occupational development, truth 
commissions, ceremonial or reparative rituals, and community service. 
 
148. Lakotta, supra note 75. 
149. Somalia’s President Wants Partial Amnesty for Boy Pirates, CNN (Feb. 
28, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/28/world/africa/somalia-boy-
pirates-amnesty/. 
150. Bahadur, supra note 36.  
151. Id. 
152. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, 
VOLUME 2: LIFEWORD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST 
REASON 357 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1987) (1981) 
(discussing how juridification means the tendency for life in modern 
societies to be characterized by “an increase in formal (or positive, 
written) law,” which takes the form of both an expansion of law into 
areas hitherto uncovered by law as well as an increasing density of law 
in areas traditionally subject to law). 
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Deployment of these mechanisms promotes Article 40(1) of the CRC, 
which provides as follows: 
States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, 
accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal law to be 
treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child’s 
sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child’s respect 
for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others and 
which takes into account the child’s age and the desirability of 
promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s assuming a 
constructive role in society.153 
In sum, I recommend that accused juvenile pirates not face 
criminal prosecution (whether in adult court or in juvenile court) but, 
instead, participate in restorative justice mechanisms to promote their 
societal reintegration. This process would include recognizing the 
harms occasioned by their suspected criminal conduct. States may be 
uncomfortable deporting children back to Somalia (or other 
jurisdictions where children enter pirate gangs) in order to face 
criminal trials. It is quite foreseeable that officials from extraditing 
states would fear that criminal proceedings conducted in such venues 
might fall short of international due process standards. Concerns may 
deflate if the proceedings instead were restorative and rehabilitative in 
nature. 
That said, just as with child soldiers, any honest assessment of 
what reintegration, redress, and transition actually entails cannot be 
based on convenient fictions of the helplessness, faultlessness, 
innocence, and cluelessness of the child pirates or, on the other hand, 
fictions as to their incorrigibility, pathology, and irredeemability. 
When child pirates cause harm, it is important not to absolve them or 
excuse them, but to forgive them through the quid pro quo of 
accountability. Forgiveness in this sense is to be earned. I have 
strenuously argued in favor of the value of transitional justice 
mechanisms of this sort in the case of former child soldiers. The 
phrase transitional justice may not be apposite to all cases of child 
pirates, insofar as many are not operating in the context of societies 
that are endeavoring to transcend sustained periods of human rights 
abuses, though in the case of Somalia (and the Niger delta) this claim 
can plausibly be made.  
Criminal trials, however, could serve a role when it comes to 
leaders of pirate gangs. In addition to prosecuting leaders for ordering 
or organizing pirate attacks, consideration could be given to 
prosecuting them for recruiting, enrolling, admitting, or forcing 
 
153. CRC, supra note 26, art. 40(1). 
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persons into the gangs.154 Factors to consider as aggravating or 
mitigating in sentencing could include the voluntary or compelled 
nature of the recruitment and the age of the recruit. These two 
factors could be entwined, in that a scale of presumed voluntariness 
could reference the age of the recruit. This scale would best be a 
spectrum instead of a bright-line anchored around the age of eighteen, 
thereby recognizing the sociological and neurobiological realities of 
older adolescents (sixteen and seventeen-year-olds) and also of young 
adults aged in their late teens and early twenties.  
Assuredly, justice mechanisms—whether restorative in the case of 
the juveniles or penal in the case of the gang leaders—are not, 
standing alone, sufficient to deter piracy and deliver justice. The 
international community needs to be vigilant in resisting the tendency 
to see the criminal convictions of a handful of recruiters—for example, 
Thomas Lubanga in the case of child soldiers in the DRC—as 
signaling that justice has been done.155 A rigorous pursuit of justice 
would look far beyond the individual pirate, and even the gang leader, 
so as to address the catalytic role of clan elders, financiers,156 weapons 
dealers,157 and profiteers (many of whom never leave shore).158 Finally, 
when it comes to the policing of piracy and the use of private security 
forces, the development of best practices regarding the capture and 
 
154. Dallaire et al., supra note 48 (proposing to expand the jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Court to include the arming of children for 
use in international criminal activities). However, many jurisdictions 
already proscribe the use of minors for criminal purposes. 
155. For discussion of this case, the limits of criminal trials of recruiters in 
attaining justice, and the risk that these trials re-victimize former child 
soldiers by inflating their victimhood, see Mark A. Drumbl, The Effects 
of the Lubanga Case on Understanding and Preventing Child Soldiering, 
15 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 87 (2012). 
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Lakotta, supra note 1 (also reporting that “[m]illions in ransom money 
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S.C. Res. 1950, supra note 13, ¶ 15. 
157. In the context of Somali piracy, weapons dealers who operate through 
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Choudhury, supra note 11. Somali piracy also allegedly has Al-Qaeda 
links. Id. 
158. Child Pirates: A New Child Rights Challenge for Somalia, supra note 
101 (“Many of the people in charge of piracy operations are not out on 
the seas themselves, but on shore in their homes in Somalia or Kenya. 
The people they actually send out to ‘do the dangerous stuff are young 
children and youth, between the ages of 15, 16 and 17,’ confirmed 
[former U.N. Special Representative] Coomaraswamy.”); Choudhury, 
supra note 11 (implicating members of the Somali diaspora). 
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detention of juveniles by anti-piracy forces would provide much 
needed clarity.  
VI.  Conclusion 
Understanding child piracy—and deterring it—requires coming to 
terms with the nuanced and diverse experiences of the children, 
juveniles, and youth who enter piracy gangs. Child pirates harm 
others and commit crimes, and they are simultaneously victims and 
victimizers, but they are also resilient and stakeholders in the future 
of their societies. Justice for individuals aggrieved by the acts of child 
pirates should not be voided by the notion that the child pirates are 
the singular victims. Understanding and deterring child piracy also 
requires coming to terms with the limits of criminal law and 
imprisonment of juvenile convicts, on the one hand, and also the 
limits of blanket amnesty and perfunctory capture and release, on the 
other. Looking ahead, restorative and rehabilitative justice 
mechanisms for juvenile pirates may offer a viable path. These 
mechanisms may provide the most effective balance by promoting the 
best interests of child pirates, while also recognizing their harmful 
conduct and, thereby, respecting the needs of all afflicted parties.  
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